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SUMMARY 
The paper  p r e s e n t s  a  methodology f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  prob- 
l e m s  of  i m p e r f e c t  i n fo rma t ion  o r  s i m p l i s t i c  modeling i n  macro- 
economic p o l i c y  problems. The methodology p e r m i t s  t o  choose a  
r o b u s t  p o l i c y  from a  g i v e n  se t  of  cand ida t e  p o l i c i e s - - t h a t  i s ,  
a  p o l i c y  t h a t  makes t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  l e a s t  s e n s i t i v e  t o  v a r i o u s  
p o t e n t i a l  modeling e r r o r s .  Th i s  can be  ach ieved  even i f  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  modeling e r r o r s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  model s t r u c t u r e  o r  de- 
l a y s  i n  model equat ions--wi thout  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e  models w i t h  
more compl ica ted  s t r u c t u r e  o r  d e l a y s  a r e  f u l l y  s o l v e d  and o p t i -  
mized. The p a r t i c u l a r  example chosen t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  method- 
o logy  i s  a  macroeconomic model o f  i n t e r t e m p o r a l  o p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  
monetary c o n t r o l  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment. The conc lu s ions  
f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  model a r e  two-fold. F i r s t l y ,  n e g l e c t e d  de- 
l a y s  o r  o t h e r  modeling e r r o r s  cannot ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  s u b s t a n t i a t e  
r i g o r o u s l y  t h e  c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e  t h a t  i s  u s u a l l y  
advanced because  of such modeling i n a c c u r a c i e s .  I n  f a c t ,  by 
choosing an a p p r o p r i a t e  feedback p o l i c y  fo rmu la t i on  it i s  poss i -  
b l e  t o  o b t a i n  r e a s o n a b l e  r e s u l t s  o f  an a c t i v e  p o l i c y  even i f  t h e  
unde r ly ing  model used f o r  p o l i c y  d e r i v a t i o n  i s  v e r y  s imple  and 
t h e  economic r e a l i t y  t o  which t h e  p o l i c y  i s  a p p l i e d  i s  much more 
compl ica ted .  Secondly,  r i g o r o u s  c a s e  can be made a g a i n s t  ' i m -  
pe tuous '  p o l i c y  making w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment, 
t h a t  is ,  a g a i n s t  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  by a t t a c h i n g  a  s m a l l  we igh t  t o  
unemployment a t t e m p t  t o  approach r a p i d l y  long-run t a r g e t s  f o r  
i n f l a t i o n .  Such a  p o l i c y  s t r a t e g y  may induce  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  e i t h e r  
through d e l a y  e f f e c t s ,  o r  by making t h e  macroeconomic sys tem ve ry  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  o t h e r  modeling e r r o r s .  
IMPERFECT INFORMATIONl SIMPLISTIC MODELING, 
AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF POLICY RULES 
D. Snower and A. Wierzbicki  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  i s  concerned wi th  t h e  formula t ion  o f  macroeco- 
nomic .po l icy  r u l e s  from macro-models which a r e  i n a c c u r a t e  r e -  
p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of economic r e a l i t y .  The models a r e  i n a c c u r a t e  
due t o  imper fec t  in format ion  o r  because they  a r e  rough approxi-  
mations of  known economic mechanisms. Rough approximat ions ,  
v i z . ,  " s i m p l i s t i c  models", may be used i n  o r d e r  t o  keep t h e  ana- 
l y t i c a l  o r  computat ional  d e r i v a t i o n s  of p o l i c y  r u l e s  manageable. 
The p o l i c y  r u l e s  a r e  meant t o  op t imize  t h e  p o l i c y  maker ' s  ob jec-  
t i v e  func t ion .  Under c o n d i t i o n s  of imper fec t  in format ion  o r  
s i m p l i s t i c  modeling, t h e  p o l i c y  maker i s  aware t h a t  p o l i c y  r u l e s  
which a r e  op t imal  w i th  regard  t o  h i s  model a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
op t imal  w i th  r ega rd  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  economic system he aims t o  
c o n t r o l .  How should t h e  p o l i c y  r u l e s  be dev ised  i n  t h e  l i g h t  of 
t h e  i n a c c u r a c i e s  of  t h e  under ly ing  model? 
I f  t h e  p o l i c y  maker f a c e s  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r i s k  r a t h e r  t han  
u n c e r t a i n t y  ( i . e . ,  h i s  imper fec t  knowledge i s  r e p r e s e n t a b l e  by a 
model whose t r u e  parameter d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  known), then  t h e  
p o l i c y  r u l e s  may be  de r ived  from a s t o c h a s t i c  op t imiza t ion  prob- 
lem. Yet such problems a r e  o f t e n  n o t o r i o u s l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  so lve .  
Besides ,  macroeconomic po l i cy  makers seldom, i f  e v e r ,  have 
perfect information on the parameter distributions of the models 
they use and these models are generally simplistic. Uncertainty 
and simplistic modeling call for a different approach to the 
formation of policy rules. 
This paper presents such an approach. Given uncertainty or 
simplistic modeling, policy makers- are commonly interested in 
devising policy rules which are not only optimal with regard to 
their model, but also insensitive to particular errors in model 
specification. In this context, imperfect information and sim- 
plistic modeling pose analogous difficulties for the formulation 
of optimal policy rules. Regardless of whether errors in model 
specification are attributable to imperfect information or de- 
liberate simplification of economic relations, our aim is to 
find policy rules which are not sensitive to these errors. To 
do so, we formulate a number of different policy rules, all of 
which are optimal with regard to the policy maker's objective 
function and model, but which are not all equally sensitive to 
changes in model specification. 
Naturally, a22 macro-economic models are simplified repre- 
sentations of actual economic activities. The rationale for 
such simplifications is that amendments to the models which 
introduce greater realism at the expense of greater complexity 
do not affect qualitatively the conclusions of the analysis at 
hand. In the formulation of optimal macro-economic policy 
rules, modeling simplifications are commonly regarded as accept- 
able if they have a negligible impact on the properties of the 
policy rules. On Occam's Rasor grounds, in fact, such simplifi- 
cations are desirable. 
It would appear, at first sight, that the application of 
Occam's Rasor requires that policy rules be derived first from 
a complex model which is the closest representation of economic 
reality which the model-builder is capable of creating and then 
successively from simpler models. Simplifications which lead to 
close approximations of the former policy rules are accepted; 
the rest are rejected. Of course, in practice macro-economic 
models are not constructed in this manner; but to the degree to 
which t h e y  a r e  n o t ,  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  cannot  be  r a t i o n a l i z e d  on 
Occam's Rasor grounds.  
The b a s i c  i n s i g h t  o f  t h i s  paper  i s  twofold .  F i r s t ,  Occam's 
Rasor may be  used n o t  o n l y  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  s i m p l i s t i c  models,  b u t  a l s o  a s  a  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  formula- 
t i o n  o f  op t ima l  p o l i c y  r u l e s .  The aim o f  o u r  a n a l y s i s  i s  t o  
f i n d  a  number o f  p o l i c y  r u l e s  which a r e  op t ima l  f o r  a  g iven  
model and t o  choose t h e  p o l i c y  r u l e  which p rov ides  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  
Occam's Rasor r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h a t  model. Second, Occam Rasor 
can be  a p p l i e d  w i thou t  e x p l i c i t l y  d e r i v i n g  t h e  po , l i cy  r u l e s  from 
a  more complex and r e a l i s t i c  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  t h e  model. 
I n  o t h e r  words, (i) t h e  p o l i c y  r u l e s  themse lves ,  i f  appro- 
p r i a t e l y  chosen,  can  make modeling s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  harmless  f o r  
t h e  fo rmu la t i on  o f  t h e s e  p o l i c y  r u l e s ,  and (ii) it i s  p o s s i b l e  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  whether a  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i s  harmless  w i thou t  ex- 
p l i c i t l y  comparing t h e  p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a  " r e a l i s t i c "  
model w i th  i t s  s i m p l i s t i c  c o u n t e r p a r t s .  
The economic l i t e r a t u r e  c o n t a i n s  numerous a t t e m p t s  t o  de- 
r i v e  op t ima l  p o l i c y  r u l e s  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  models which a r e  i n -  
c o r r e c t l y  s p e c i f i e d .  Perhaps  t h e  most prominent  a t t e m p t  i s  t h e  
m o n e t a r i s t  argument t h a t  t h e  money supply  shou ld  grow a t  a  con- 
s t a n t  pe r cen t age  r a t e  p e r  annum, because  t h e  magnitude and t i m -  
i n g  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  money supply  change on a g g r e g a t e  demand 
a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t .  ' )  However, t h e  m o n e t a r i s t s  have n o t  
e x p l a i n e d  p r e c i s e l y  how t h e  c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e  may be 
deduced from t h e  assumption o f  modeling inaccuracy .  Presumably, 
t h e y  do n o t  i n t e n d  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  such  a  r u l e  i n v a r i a b l y  
emerges a s  t h e  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n  o f  a  s t o c h a s t i c  o p t i m i z a t i o n  
problem i n  which t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  money supply  and ag- 
g r e g a t e  demand i s  d e s c r i b e d  by paramete rs  w i th  known d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n s .  
Nor does  t h e  c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e  n e c e s s a r i l y  
emerge from o u r  methodology f o r  t h e  cho i ce  o f  op t ima l  p o l i c y  
r u l e s ,  a s  w e  w i l l  show. To i l l u s t r a t e  o u r  methodology w e  w i l l  
d e r i v e  monetary p o l i c y  r u l e s  from a  model c o n t a i n i n g  an expec ta -  
t ions-augmented P h i l l i p s  curve .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  assume t h a t  
the policy maker's objective function depends on unemployment 
and expected inflation. According to the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve, actual inflation depends inversely on the un- 
employment rate and positively on the expected inflation rate. 
Inflationary expectations are generated by an adaptive mechanism. 
The policy maker can influence the rate of unemployment by chang- 
ing the growth rate of the money supply. 
A rise in this growth rate decreases the unemployment rate 
in the short run (and thereby raises the value of the policy 
objective function) and increases the expected inflation rate in 
the medium run (and thereby lowering the value of the policy ob- 
jective function). The policy maker presumes that the Phillips 
curve or the adaptive expectations mechanism are incorrectly 
specified. How should the optimal monetary rule be formulated? 
This policy problem merely serves an illustrative purpose 
in our analysis of the formulation of policy rules. In general, 
our analysis pertains to any dynamic model in which (a) a pres- 
ent policy impulse affects the value of the policy objective 
function (henceforth called, euphemistically, the "social wel- 
fare function") at present and in the future, (b) there is an 
intertemporal tradeoff between these effects (such that a pres- 
ent social welfare gain is associated with a future welfare loss, 
and vice versa), and (c) the model is an inaccurate representa- 
tion of actual economic processes. 
A diverse assortment of important macroeconomic policy 
problems share these properties. In the standard theory of op- 
timal economic growth, there is a tradeoff between the produc- 
tion of nondurable consumption and investment goods, and social 
welfare depends on the flow of consumption through time. If the 
policy maker stimulates durable consumption, social welfare 
rises in tne short run, but falls in the longer run (since the 
capital stock whereby future consumption goods can be produced, 
grows more slowly than it would have done in the absence of the 
consumption stimulus). The policy maker may be aware that his 
depiction of the production possibility frontier is an inaccu- 
rate representation of the actual tradeoff between consumption 
and inves tment  good p r o d u c t i on .  I n  t h e  b a s i c  t h e o r y  o f  op t ima l  
r e s o u r c e  d e p l e t i o n  c o n t r o l ,  a  p o l i c y  s t i m u l u s  t o  t h e  p roduc t i on  
o f  nondurable  consumption goods i m p l i e s  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  
of  r e s o u r c e  d e p l e t i o n .  Thus, s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  rises i n  t h e  s h o r t  
r u n ,  b u t  f a l l s  i n  t h e  l o n g e r  r un  ( s i n c e  t h e  r e s o u r c e s ,  nece s sa ry  
f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  f u t u r e  consumption goods,  a r e  d e p l e t e d  a t  
a  more r a p i d  r a t e ) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  op t ima l  p o l l u -  
t i o n  c o n t r o l ,  a  consumption s t i m u l u s  g i v e s  rise t o  a  l a r g e r  f low 
of d u r a b l e  p o l l u t a n t s .  S o c i a l  w e l f a r e  rises i n  t h e  s h o r t  r un  on 
account  of  t h e  consumption s t i m u l u s ,  and f a l l s  i n  t h e  l o n g e r  r u n  
on account  of  t h e  argumented p o l l u t a n t  s t o c k .  The p o l i c y  maker 
may s e e k  t h e  o p t i m a l  consumption t r a j e c t o r y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  an 
i n a c c u r a t e  model of  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between consumption and re- 
s o u r c e  d e p l e t i o n  o r  between consumption and p o l l u t i o n .  T h i s  
l i s t  of examples co u l d  be extended cons ide r ab ly .  Our a n a l y s i s  
of  p o l i c y  r u l e s  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  w e l l  t o  a l l  o f  them. Our cho i ce  
of  monetary p o l i c y  r u l e s  t o  c o n t r o l  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment 
i s  t o  be unders tood  a s  a  c o n c r e t e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  a  methodology 
w i t h  r a t h e r  wide a p p l i c a t i o n .  
The expecta t ions-augmented P h i l l i p s  curve  i n  o u r  model em- 
b o d i e s  t h e  n a t u r a l  r a t e  h ypo the s i s .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  un- 
employment r a t e  i s  s o l e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  e r r o r s  i n  i n f l a t i o n a r y  ex- 
p e c t a t i o n s .  C o r r e c t  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  a  unique  r a t e  of  unemployment, t h e  " n a t u r a l "  r a t e .  The 
lower t h e  r a t e  of  unemployment, t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e  of 
i n f l a t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  expec ted  r a t e  of  i n f l a t i o n .  The n a t -  
u r a l  r a t e  of h y p o t h e s i s  h a s  r e c e i v e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e m p i r i c a l  
s u p p o r t  ( e . g . ,  Gordon 1972,  Turnowsky 1972, Vanderkamp 1972,  
P a r k i n  1973,  Mackay & H ar t  1974, P a r k i n ,  Summer & Ward 1976, 
Lucas & Rapping 1 9 6 9 ,  Darby 1976) and ha s  been g iven  v a r i o u s  
l o g i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t ,  b u t  n o t  mutua l ly  e x c l u s i v e  mic rofounda t ions  
( e . g . ,  t h e  "misperce ived  r e a l  wage" paradigm of  Friedman 1968, 
Lucas 1972, 1973, and S a r g e n t  1973; t h e  " j o b  s e a r c h "  paradigm of  
Alch ian  1970,  McCall 1970, Mortensen 1970,  Gronau 1971,  Parsons  
1973, Sa lop  1973, Lucas & P r e s c o t t  1974, and S iven  1974; and t h e  
" p r i c e  s e t t i n g "  paradigm of  Phe lp s  1970) .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  adap t ive  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanism, 
which we use  t o  g e n e r a t e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  has  n o t  been 
given much a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  macroeconomic l i t e r a t u r e  s i n c e  t h e  
theory  of r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  came i n t o  widespread use.  How- 
e v e r ,  s e v e r a l  reasons  may be given f o r  ou r  use  of adap t ive  ex- 
pec ta t ions :  Adaptive e x p e c t a t i o n s  might be considered a s  a  
r e a l i s t i c  approximation of t h e  i d e a l  p roces s  of r a t i o n a l  expec- 
t a t i o n s .  I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  recognized t h a t  i f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  macro-economic model changes and economic agen t s  g a i n  i n f o r -  
mation on t h i s  change through a  c o s t l y  p rocess  of  l e a r n i n g ,  then  
t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  cannot  be expected t o  be r a t i o n a l  du r ing  t h i s  
p rocess .  For such c i rcumstances ,  adap t ive  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mecha- 
nisms ( p o s s i b l y  wi th  f l e x i b l e  adjustment  c o e f f i c i e n t s )  can be 
mot ivated on t h e o r e t i c a l  (e .g . ,  Friedman 1979, S h i l l e r  1978, 
Taylor  1975, and De Canio 1976) and empi r i ca l  grounds ( e .g . ,  
Lawson 1980, L a h i r i  1976, and Turnowsky 1970) .  
I n  our  a n a l y s i s  w e  cons ide r  monetary p o l i c y  which, i n t e r  
a l i a ,  t a k e s  t h e  form of  c losed- loop c o n t r o l  of unemployment. 
Here monetary impulses cannot  be s p e c i f i e d  a t  p r e s e n t  f o r  a l l  
f u t u r e  p o i n t s  i n  t i m e .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  growth r a t e  of t h e  money 
supply w i l l  depend on how t h e  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  of ou r  model ( t h e  
expected r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n )  evolves  through t i m e .  Y e t  s i n c e  
our  model (by assumption) i s  an i n a c c u r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of 
a c t u a l  economic a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of  t h e  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  
cannot  be p r e c i s e l y  foreseen .  Consequently, t h e  growth r a t e  of 
t h e  money supply i s  no t  p e r f e c t l y  p r e d i c t a b l e  e i t h e r .  Provided 
t h a t  t h e  monetary a u t h o r i t y  i s  a b l e  t o  change t h e  money growth 
r a t e  f a s t e r  t han  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  a b l e  t o  l e a r n  of  t h i s  change, 
t h e  p u b l i c  cannot  be expected t o  have r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
con t ingen t  on t h e  monetary a u t h o r i t y ' s  in format ion  s e t .  
W e  assume t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  forms i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a d a p t i v e l y  
i n s t e a d .  For s i m p l i c i t y ,  t h e  adjustment  c o e f f i c i e n t  of t h e  
adap t ive  expec t a t i ons  mechanism i s  he ld  c o n s t a n t  through t ime.  2 
Admittedly,  w e  a l s o  use  t h i s  mechanism when monetary p o l i c y  
t a k e s  t h e  form of open-loop c o n t r o l .  Yet, i f  t h e  p u b l i c  knows 
t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  form of  t h e  expectations-augmented P h i l l i p s  curve 
and of t h e  monetary a u t h o r i t y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  t hen  it can 
perfectly predict open-loop control policies and thus can be ex- 
pected to have rational expectations contingent on the monetary 
authority's information set. If rational expectations are as- 
sumed, however, our policy exercise becomes rather uninteresting, 
for then monetary policy rules are no longer able to affect the 
unemployment rate. The natural rate hypothesis makes the unem- 
ployment rate depend on errors in inflationary expectations, 
while the rational expectations hypothesis ensures (in the con- 
text of our analysis) that such errors do not occur. Thus, 
systematic monetary policy is impotent. (See, for example, 
Sargent and Wallace 1975, 1976, Sargent 1973, 1976, and Barro 
1976) . 3 
In our analysis, serving as it does primarily illustrative 
purposes, the assumption of adaptive expectations is retained 
even under open-loop policies. As noted, the analysis also 
applies to the choice of policy rules in macroeconomic models 
centering around the tradeoffs between consumption and pollution, 
consumption and resource depletion, and consumption and capital 
accumulation. In these latter models, government policies are 
commonly assumed to affect consumption either directly (via 
government consumption expenditures) or indirectly (via taxes 
or environmental controls). Here the assumption of rational 
expectations does not necessarily make policy rules ineffective 
with regard to real economic variables. (See, for example, 
McCallum and Whitaker 1979, Buiter 1977, and Tobin and Buiter 
1980). To maintain the applicability of our analysis to these 
policy problems and to keep the structure of our model monolith- 
ic, the assumption of adaptive expectations is made for all our 
policy exercises. 
The problem of choosing policy rules under imperfect in- 
formation or simplistic modeling is approached in accordance 
with the methodology suggested by Wierzbicki (1977). Two macro- 
economic models are considered: 
(1) The basic mode2 is used by the policy maker to devise optimal 
policy rules. It may be a simplified version of a more realistic 
model or it may be inaccurate because of the policy maker's im- 
perfect information about macroeconomic activity. 
( 2 )  The extended mdeZ i s  o u r  proxy f o r  " a c t u a l "  macroeconomic 
a c t i v i t y .  T h i s  model i s  unknown t o  t h e  p o l i c y  maker o r  i n t r a c t -  
a b l e  f o r  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of  p o l i c y  r u l e s .  I t  s e r v e s  t o  i n d i c a t e  
v a r i o u s  ways i n  which economic r e a l i t y  may d i f f e r  from t h e  b a s i c  
model. P o l i c y  r u l e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  b a s i c ,  n o t  
t h e  ex tended ,  model. Thus, t h e  ex tended  model s imply  p r o v i d e s  
a  c o n c r e t e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  t h e  p o l i c y  maker f a c e s  
o r  of  t h e  need f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  s i m p l i s t i c  models. 
A p o l i c y  maker who i s  u n c e r t a i n  a s  t o  t h e  accu racy  o f  h i s  
model may wish  t o  t e s t  h i s  p o l i c i e s  on a proxy o f  economic r e a l -  
i t y  b e f o r e  implementing them. The ex tended  model i s  such a 
proxy.  4 
W e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h r e e  ways i n  which t h e  b a s i c  model may be 
an i n a c c u r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  ex tended  model: 
( a )  Mistaken paramete r  e s t i m a t e s :  The (nonzero)  c o e f f i c i e n t s  
o f  t h e  expecta t ions-augmented P h i l l i p s  cu rve  i n  t h e  b a s i c  model 
d i f f e r  from t h o s e  i n  t h e  ex tended  model. T h i s  i naccu racy  i s  
a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  i m p e r f e c t  i n fo rma t ion  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  s i m p l i s t i c  
modeling. 
( b )  Mistaken f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n :  The f u n c t i o n a l  form of  
t h e  expecta t ions-augmented P h i l l i p s  curve  i n  t h e  b a s i c  model 
d i f f e r s  from t h a t  i n  t h e  ex tended  model. 5, ~ o t h  i m p e r f e c t  i n -  
fo rmat ion  and s i m p l i s t i c  modeling may be  t h e  sou rce  o f  t h i s  
i naccu r acy .  
(c)  Mistaken d e l a y  e s t i m a t e s 6 '  : The b a s i c  model ' s  P h i l l i p s  
curve  ha s  a  d i f f e r e n t  d e l a y  s t r u c t u r e  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  ex tended  
model. A s  a s imple  example, t h e  b a s i c  model may i g n o r e  d e l a y s  
i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment, w h i l e  t h e  
extended model t a k e s  them i n t o  account .  T h i s ,  t o o ,  can be a t -  
t r i b u t e d  t o  bo th  i m p e r f e c t  i n fo rma t ion  and s i m p l i s t i c  modeling.  
A s  w e  s h a l l  see, it i s  q u i t e  s imple  t o  ex tend  o u t  ana1.ys is  
t o  i n c l u d e  t h e s e  modeling i n a c c u r a c i e s  n o t  on ly  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  expecta t ions-augmented P h i l l i p s  cu rve ,  b u t  a l s o  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  r a t e  o f  growth o f  t h e  money 
supp ly  and t h e  unemployment r a t e .  Modeling i n a c c u r a c i e s  o f  t h i s  
s o r t  a r e ,  a s  no t ed ,  a  major  r e a son  why m o n e t a r i s t s  advoca te  
c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e s .  S i n c e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  
money supp ly  on t h e  one hand and i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r e d i c t  bo th  i n  magnitude and 
t i m e  s t r u c t u r e - - s o  t h e  argument runs-- the money supp ly  shou ld  be 
expanded a t  a  c o n s t a n t  pe r cen t age  r a t e  p e r  annum. W e  w i l l  exam- 
i n e  t h i s  argument i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  o u r  methodology f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  
o f  p o l i c y  r u l e s .  I n  o t h e r  words, g iven  t h a t  one  o r  more o f  t h e  
modeling mi s t akes  above i s  made, w e  w i l l  s p e c i f y  a  number o f  
p o l i c y  r u l e s  which a r e  op t ima l  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  b a s i c  model 
and t h e n  choose t h e  r u l e  which makes s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  l e a s t  s e n s i -  
t i v e  t o  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  mi s t akes .  W e  c a l l  t h i s  r u l e  " r o b u s t "  
w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  modeling e r r o r s .  I t  w i l l  be  shown t h a t  con- 
s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e s  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  emerge from t h i s  
e x e r c i s e .  I f  t h e r e  i s  a  c a s e  t o  be made f o r  such  r u l e s ,  t h e n  
t h i s  depends ve ry  much on some c r u c i a l  pa r ame te r s  o f  t h e  b a s i c  
model. 
A s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  below i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  o f  i n -  
f l a t i o n  and unemployment which a r e  induced by a  g i v e n  p o l i c y  
r u l e  may be d e s c r i b e d  i n  t e r m s  of  two components: ( a )  t h e  long- 
r u n  op t ima l  s t a t i o n a r y  l e v e l s  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment, and 
( b )  t h e  r a t e  a t  which i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment approach t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  long-run l e v e l s  th rough  t i m e .  Some v a l u e s  o f  c r u c i a l  
pa ramete r s  of  t h e  b a s i c  model (mos t ly ,  a  l a r g e r  we igh t  g iven  t o  
i n f l a t i o n  v e r s u s  unemployment i n  t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l )  
induce  f a s t e r  r a t e s  o f  approach t h a n  o t h e r s .  I t  w i l l  be shown 
t h a t  t h o s e  pa ramete r  v a l u e s  which cause  t h e  r a t e s  o f  approach 
exceed c e r t a i n  t h r e s h o l d  l e v e l s  run  t h e  danger  of  making t h e  
macroeconomic system u n s t a b l e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  
dynamic behav iour  becomes ve ry  s e n s i t i v e  t o  modeling e r r o r s  and 
t h u s  t h e  p o l i c y  maker ha s  l i t t l e  chance t o  ma in t a in  bo th  i n f l a -  
t i o n  and unemployment n e a r  t h e i r  t a r g e t  p a t h s .  T h i s  might  be 
cons ide r ed  a s  an argument f o r  a  c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e  
because  of t h e  b a s i c  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a c h i e v i n g  any th ing  b e t t e r  by 
a  more a c t i v e  p o l i c y .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
w i t h  pa ramete r s  which induce  s lower  r a t e s  of  approach r e s u l t  i n  
p o l i c y  r u l e s  which do n o t  have t h i s  u n d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t y ,  and a  
c o n s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e  canno t  be s u b s t a n t i a t e d  i n  such  a  
c a s e .  T h i s  i s ,  however, n o t  an  argument f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  a  con- 
s t a n t  monetary growth r u l e ,  b u t  much r a t h e r  an  argument a g a i n s t  
t r y i n g  t o  r e a c h  long-run t a r g e t s  f o r  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment 
i n  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  I t  appea r s  t h a t  t h i s  argument i s  n o t  
a  t h e o r e t i c a l  c u r i o ,  b u t  a  c a s e  of  immediate and f a r - r e a c h i n g  
p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  Over t h e  p a s t  y e a r s  t h e r e  has  been a  hea t ed  
con t r ove r sy  i n  a  number o f  mature market  economies--the Uni ted  
S t a t e s ,  G r e a t  B r i t a i n ,  Germany and o the rs - -abou t  how f a s t  a  
government shou ld  a t t e m p t  t o  reduce  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  t o  i t s  
long-run t a r g e t  l e v e l .  Thus f a r ,  a  government ' s  deg ree  o f  "im- 
p a t i e n c e "  w i t h  i n f l a t i o n  ha s  been viewed l a r g e l y  a s  a  q u e s t i o n  
o f  t a s t e .  The more we igh t  a  government a t t a c h e s  t o  i n f l a t i o n  
r e l a t i v e  t o  unemployment i n  i t s  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  
f a s t e r  it shou ld  d r i v e  t h e  r a t e  of  i n f l a t i o n  towards t h e  long- 
r un  i n f l a t i o n  t a r g e t .  Our a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  " t a s t e "  i s  n o t  
t h e  end o f  t h e  m a t t e r .  W e  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  " i m p a t i e n t "  governments 
r un  t h e  r i s k  o f  macroeconomic i n s t a b i l i t y .  I n  o t h e r  words,  a  
c a s e - - un re l a t ed  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  maker ' s  p r e f e r e n c e s - - i s  t o  be made 
f o r  t h e  less impetuous p o l i c y  d i r e c t i v e s .  
The paper  i s  o r g a n i z e d  a s  f o l l ows .  S e c t i o n  2 p r e s e n t s  t h e  
unde r ly ing  macroeconomic model and d e s c r i b e s  v a r i o u s  monetary 
p o l i c y  r u l e s .  S e c t i o n  3 p r o v i d e s  a n a l y t i c a l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  
p o l i c y  problems.  S e c t i o n  4 d e s c r i b e s  t h e  methodology o f  o u r  
r o b u s t n e s s  a n a l y s i s ,  i . e . ,  p rov ide s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  
of  p o l i c y  r u l e s .  S e c t i o n  5 e v a l u a t e s  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l i c y  r u l e s  
by means o f  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a .  F i n a l l y ,  S e c t i o n  6 c o n t a i n s  a  b r i e f  
overview. 
2 .  STATEMENT OF THE POLICY PROBLEM 
The b a s i c  model c o n s i s t s  of  t h r e e  a n a l y t i c a l  b u i l d i n g  
b locks :  (i) a  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  expec t ed  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  
and t h e  r a t e  o f  unemployment, (ii) a  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  r a t e  
o f  growth o f  t h e  money supp ly  and t h e  unemployment r a t e ,  and 
( i i i l  a  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l  which depends on t h e  expec t ed  
r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and t h e  r a t e  of  unemployment. 
The f i r s t  b u i l d i n g  b lock  i s  composed of  an e x p e c t a t i o n s -  
augmented P h i l l i p s  cu rve  and an  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanism. 
L e t  x  be t h e  ex p ec t ed  r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n ,  x  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e  of 
a  
i n f l a t i o n ,  u  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e  of  unemployment, and u  t h e  n a t u r a l  
n  
r a t e  of  unemployment. Then t h e  P h i l l i p s  cu rve  i s  
where A i s  a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t .  I n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  
g e n e r a t e d  by 
where B i s  a l s o  a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t  and K i s  t h e  r a t e  o f  change 
o f  x  th rough  t i m e .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  (1) i n t o  ( 2 )  , 
where C = A m B > O .  
The second b u i l d i n g  b lock  i s  composed of  a  q u a n t i t y  t h e o r y  
o f  money and a  v a r i a n t  o f  Okun's Law. ') L e t  M be t h e  s t o c k  of 
money, V t h e  income v e l o c i t y  o f  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  P t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  
and Q t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  goods and s e r v i c e s .  Then 
Suppose t h a t  V i s  c o n s t a n t .  L e t  g  be t h e  growth i n  p roduc t i on  
and m t h e  growth i n  t h e  money supp ly ,  which i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  e q u a l  
t o  t h e  growth i n  money demand. Then 
L e t  gn be t h e  t r e n d  r a t e  of p roduc t i on  growth. Then o u r  v a r i a n t  
o f  Okun's Law can be e x p r e s s e d  a s  
where 6 i s  a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  (6 )  i n t o  ( 5 )  , 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (1) i n t o  (7), 
The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  maker a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a  
" s o c i a l  w e l f a r e "  f u n c t i o n a l .  A t  every  i n s t a n t  of  t i m e  s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e  depends on t h e  expec t ed  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  and t h e  unemploy- 
ment r a t e  a s  f o l l ows :  
where q i s  a  p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t .  A rise i n  t h e  expec t ed  i n f l a -  
t i o n  r a t e  a f f e c t s  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  a d v e r s e l y  because  it i nduces  
economic a g e n t s  t o  economize on money b a l a n c e s  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  
b e a r  t h e  h i g h e r  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s  o f  exchanging money f o r  
i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  a s s e t s .  A r ise i n  t h e  unemployment r a t e  a l s o  
lowers  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  s i n c e  t h e  marg ina l  u t i l i t y  o f  consumption 
i s  always assumed t o  be  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  marg ina l  d i s u t i l i t y  of  
t h e  l a b o u r  r e q u i r e d  t o  produce one u n i t  of  t h e  consumption good. 
The marg ina l  u t i l i t i e s  o f  b o t h  expec ted  i n f l a t i o n  and unemploy- 
ment a r e  assumed t o  be  n e g a t i v e  and d e c l i n i n g .  
From ( 3 )  it i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  a  f a l l  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  r a t e  o f  
unemployment r a i s e s  t h e  f u t u r e  r a t e  o f  change o f  expec t ed  i n f l a -  
t i o n .  Thus a  c u r r e n t  w e l f a r e  g a i n  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  f u t u r e  
w e l f a r e  l o s s  (and v i c e  v e r s a ) .  The p o l i c y  maker f a c e s  an  i n t e r -  
temporal  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem. W e  assume t h a t  he  maximizes 
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  from t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e  ( t i m e  t = O )  t o  t h e  i n f i n i t e  
f u t u r e .  H i s  r a t e  of  t i m e  d i s c o u n t ,  r,  i s  c o n s t a n t  and s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e  occu r ing  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s  i n  t i m e  e n t e r s  h i s  ob j ec -  
t i v e  f u n c t i o n  a d d i t i v e l y .  8, Hence, t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n -  
a l  may be w r i t t e n  a s :  
I n  sum, t h e  p o l i c y  problem i s  t o  maximize ( 1 0 )  s u b j e c t  t o  (3 )  
and ( 8 ) ,  where m i s  t h e  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e  and x  and u  a r e  t h e  
s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s .  Note t h e  m i s  n o t  an argument of t h e  s o c i a l  
we l f a re  f u n c t i o n a l ;  t h e r e  a r e  no p o l i c y  ins t rument  adjustment  
c o s t s .  Assume f o r  t h e  moment, t h a t  m can be changed i n s t a n t a -  
neously by i n f i n i t e l y  l a r g e  amounts; thereby  g iv ing  r i s e  t o  i n -  
s t an t aneous ,  f i n i t e  changes of u ,  a s  determined v i a  Equation ( 8 ) .  
Then, t h e  p o l i c y  problem may be r e s t a t e d  i n  t h e  fo l lowing ,  s i m -  
p l e r  form: 
00 1 = /  e  - . ( l-T . x2-9 - u2)  d t .  2 
Jo 
s u b j e c t  t o  3r = -C (u-un) , 
where x  i s  t h e  only  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  and u  may be termed a  " su r ro -  
g a t e  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e " .  However, it i s  w e l l  known ( s e e ,  f o r  
example, Markus and Lee 1967) t h a t  t h e  op t imal  c o n t r o l  u  f o r  t h e  
problem (11) i s  a  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  func t ion  of t ime.  Thus, t h e  
op t imal  G i s  w e l l  d e f i n e d  and given t h i s  G a long  w i t h  t h e  o p t i -  
mal t r a j e c t o r i e s  f o r  u  and x,  we can compute t h e  op t imal  m from 
( 8 ) .  Consequently,  m i s  cont inuous wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t ime and s o  
t h e  d i scon t inuous  changes i n  m ,  assumed above, a r e  n o t  r e a l l y  
needed. Hence, t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  of m which keeps u  on t h e  pa th  
p r e s c r i b e d  by o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem (11) i s  opt imal  w i th  regard  
t o  t h e  maximization of ( 1 0 )  s u b j e c t  t o  (3 )  and (8 )  . Thus, u  may 
be used a s  a  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e  i n  problem (11) even though it 
e n t e r s  a s  a  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  o t h e r  problem. 
Problem (11) s e r v e s  a s  ou r  b a s i c  model. The extended model 
may d i f f e r  from t h e  b a s i c  one i n  va r ious  ways. I n  t h e  case  of 
mistaken parameter e s t i m a t e s ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  equa t ion  of t h e  
extended model may be w r i t t e n  a s  
where (S-C) o r  (8,-u ) i s  a  measure of t h e  mis take i n  parameter 
n  
e s t ima t ion .  For t h e  sake of b r e v i t y ,  we w i l l  cons ider  only  t h e  
case  of a  mis take e s t i m a t e  of un. 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of mistaken f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  we choose 
t h e  fo l lowing  expectations-augmented P h i l l i p s  curve f o r  ou r  ex- 
tended model: 
2 x = x - A [ u - u  u - u  I
a n 2 (13) 
where y i s  a parameter ( n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  p o s i t i v e ) .  (Note t h a t  
x=x wherever u=u ) .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 2 )  i n t o  ( 1 3 ) ,  we o b t a i n  
a n 
I n  t h e  ca se  of mistaken de l ay  e s t i m a t e s ,  t h e  fo l lowing  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  equa t ion  i s  used f o r  t h e  extended model: 
where T denotes  t h e  l e n g t h  of t ime whereby k i s  delayed behind 
u. 10 
I.Je now come t o  t h e  c rux  of ou r  p o l i c y  e x e r c i s e .  How should 
t h e  p o l i c y  r u l e  f o r  u (and hence f o r  m) be dev ised ,  g iven t h a t  
t h e  p o l i c y  maker knows t h a t  h i s  h a s i c  model c o n t a i n s  one o r  more 
of t h e  modeling e r r o r s  above? We assuns  t h a t ,  on account  of i m -  
p e r f e c t  in format ion  o r  s i m p l i s t i c  modeling, t h e  p o l i c y  maker i s  
unable t o  c o r r e c t  t h e s e  e r r o r s ,  and t h e r e f o r e ,  unable t:o d e r i v e  
h i s  p o l i c y  r u l e  by op t imiz ing  over  t h e  extended model. 
A s  noted,  our  n~ethodology f o r  t h e  choice  of p o l i c y  r u l e  may 
be summarized i n  two s t e p s .  F i r s t ,  d e r i v e  a number of p o l i c y  
r u l e s ,  each of which a r e  opt imal  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  b a s i c  model. 
Second, f i n d  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  when app l i ed  t c  t h e  extended model, 
makes s o c i a l  we l f a re  minimally s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  modeling e r r o r s  
above. This  i s  t h e  r u l e  t o  be adopted i n  t h e  l i g h t  of imper fec t  
in format ion  o r  s i m p l i s t i c  modeling. Needless t o  s a y ,  t h e  sen- 
s i t i v i t y  a n a l y s i s  must be undertaken wi thout  s o l v i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  
problem i n  terms of t h e  extended model. 
A "po l i cy"  i s  a mapping from a s e t  of v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  ex- 
tended model ( o r  t h e i r  c o u n t e r p a r t s  i n  economic r e a l i t y )  i n t o  
t h e  se t  o f  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s .  Every p o l i c y  which maximizes t h e  
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  b a s i c  model w e  
s h a l l  c a l l  a  " b a s i c - o p t i m a l "  p o l i c y .  A number o f  d i f f e r e n t  po l -  
i c ies ,  a s  w e  s h a l l  see, may a l l  be ba s i c -op t ima l ;  y e t ,  t h ey  may 
n o t  have t h e  same w e l f a r e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  when a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  ex- 
t ended  model. 
The f o l l o w i n g  a r e  a  sample o f  b a s i c  op t ima l  p o l i c i e s .  
(1) Open-loop control: Find t h e  ba s i c -op t ima l  t r a j e c t o r y  of  t h e  
c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e .  Manipula te  t h e  a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  u  (which i s  
g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  ex tended  model, n o t  t h e  b a s i c  model) s o  t h a t  u  
remains  on t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y .  
Here, t h e  t i m e  p a t h  o f  t h e  unemployment r a t e  i s  p r e d e t e r -  
mined from t h e  p r e s e n t  till t h e  i n f i n i t e  f u t u r e ;  it does  n o t  
depend on d i s c r e p a n c i e s  between t h e  behav iour  o f  t h e  b a s i c  and 
extended model. I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  money supp ly  must be manip- 
u l a t e d  t o  keep unemployment on t h e  p rede te rmined ,  ba s i c -op t ima l  
p a t h .  
( 2 )  ClassicaZ closed-loop control: Find t h e  ba s i c -op t ima l  r e l a t i o n  
between u  and x  t h r o u g h  t i m e .  For  t h e  x  gene ra t ed  by t h e  ex- 
t ended  model a t  ev e r y  p o i n t  i n  t i m e ,  set t h e  a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  u  
i n  accordance  w i t h  t h e  above r e l a t i o n .  
Hence, t h e  t i m e  p a t h  o f  t h e  unemployment r a t e  depends on 
t h e  obse rved  v a l u e  of  x  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  x  gene ra t e d  
by t h e  b a s i c  mode l ) .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  money supp ly  must be 
manipula ted  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  p rede te rmined  dynamic r e l a t i o n  be- 
tween t h e  ex p ec t ed  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  and t h e  unemployment r a t e .  
( 3 ) State trajectory tracking control: Find  t h e  ba s i c -op t ima l  t r a -  
j e c t o r y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e ,  x.  S e t  u  such  t h a t  x  remains  on 
t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y .  Here, t h e  money supp ly  i s  a d j u s t e d  t o  keep t h e  
e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  on a  p rede te rmined  p a t h .  
I n  S e c t i o n  3 ,  it i s  shown t h a t  p o l i c i e s  ( 1 ) - ( 3 )  a r e  s p e c i a l  
c a s e s  drawn from a  f am i l y  o f  ba s i c -op t ima l  p o l i c i e s  w i t h  i n f i -  
n i t e l y  many members. 
( 4 )  Open-loop, Hmiltonian-optimizing control: Find t h e  ba s i c -op t ima l  
t r a j e c t o r y  of t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e .  S e t  u  such t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  
va lue  Hamiltonian,  de f ined  i n  t e r m s  of t h e  above c o s t a t e  v a r i -  
a b l e  and t h e  P h i l l i p s  curve of t h e  extended model, i s  maximized. 
H e r e ,  t h e  p o l i c y  i s  t o  maximize, a t  each p o i n t  of t i m e ,  t h e  
observed d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  c u r r e n t  we l f a re  and t h e  s o c i a l  
c o s t  of accumulation of i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( i . e . ,  t h e  
c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e )  . 
( 5  ) Closed-loop, Hamiltonian-optimizing control: Find t h e  bas i c -  
op t imal  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  and t h e  expected 
i n f l a t i o n  x  through t ime.  For t h e  x  genera ted  by t h e  extended 
model a t  every p o i n t  i n  t ime,  s e t  t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  i n  ac- 
cordance wi th  t h e  above r e l a t i o n .  S e t  u  such t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  
va lue  Hamiltonian,  d e f i n e d  i n  terms of t h e  above c o s t a t e  v a r i -  
a b l e  and t h e  P h i l l i p s  curve of t h e  extended model, i s  maximized. 
( 6  ) Open-loop, benefit-cost control: Find t h e  bas ic -op t imal  t r a -  
j ec to ry  of t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e .  Define t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  
a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  i n  t ime t o  be s o c i a l  we l f a re  ( a t  t h a t  
p o i n t  i n  t i m e )  d i v i d e d  by t h e  s o c i a l  c o s t  of accumulation of i n -  
f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( a t  t h a t  p o i n t  i n  t i m e ) ,  a s  g iven  by t h e  
above c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  and t h e  P h i l l i p s  curve of t h e  extended 
model. S e t  u  such t h a t  t h i s  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  i s  maximized a t  
every p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  
( 7 )  Closed-loop, benefit-cost control: Find t h e  bas ic -op t imal  r e l a -  
t i o n  between t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  and x  through t ime.  For t h e  
x  genera ted  by t h e  extended model a t  every p o i n t  i n  t ime ,  set  
t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  i n  accordance wi th  t h e  above r e l a t i o n .  S e t  
u  such t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o ,  de f ined  i n  t e r m s  of  t h e  
above c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  and t h e  P h i l l i p s  curve of t h e  extended 
model, i s  maximized a t  every p o i n t  i n  t ime.  
A s  f o r  p o l i c i e s  (1) - (3 )  , p o l i c i e s  ( 4 )  - ( 7 )  can be combined 
t o  gene ra t e  y e t  f u r t n e r  p o l i c y  op t ions .  A l l  above p o l i c i e s  a r e  
e q u i v a l e n t  and op t imal  i f  t h e  extended model i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  
b a s i c  one. 
What now remains t o  be done i s  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  
r i g o r o u s l y  and t o  f i n d  t h o s e  p o l i c i e s  which a r e  l e a s t  s e n s i t i v e  
t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  modeling e r r o r s  cons idered  above. Th i s  i s  t h e  
s u b j e c t  of t h e  fo l lowing  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  
3 .  DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
The c u r r e n t - v a l u e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  problem (11) 
h a s  t h e  form 
where z;(t) i s  t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  s o c i a l  c o s t  o f  ac-  
cumula t ing  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  The f i r s t - o r d e r  n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n  i s  
which i s  a l s o  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  s i n c e  H i s  s t r o n g l y  con- 
cave .  The c o s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  h a s  t h e  form 
and t h e  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 )  , a f t e r  s u b s t i t u t i n g  (17)  , t a k e s  t h e  
form 
Var ious  methods c a n  be  used f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e  sys tem o f  ca-  
n o n i c a l  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 8 ) ,  (19)  and f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  (11). To d e r i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  
r u l e s ,  however, it i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  u s e  t h e  R i c c a t i  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
(see, f o r  example, A l t h a n s  and F a l b  1966) : 
i n  whicn ( a s  shown i n  t h e  appendix)  K ( t )  i s  d e f i n e d  by t h e  
R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n  
and ~ ( t )  by t h e  a u x i l i a r y  e q u a t i o n  
c2 
~ ( t )  = (: ~ ( t )  + r ) ~ ( t )  -CunK( t )  
One of t h e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  o p t i -  
mal s o l u t i o n s ,  i f  t h e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  i s  s t r o n g l y  concave,  
i s  t h a t  t h e  R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 1 ) ,  when s o l v e d  backward i n  t i m e ,  
h a s  a  bounded s o l u t i o n .  For t h e  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 1 ) ,  such a  s o l u t i o n  
does  e x i s t  (see t h e  appendix)  and h a s  t h e  fo l l owing  form: 
The co r r e sp o n d i n g  s o l u t i o n  o f  (22)  i s  
Now, s u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 2 0 ) ,  ( 2 3 ) ,  (24)  i n t o  ( 9 ) ,  (10)  and so lv -  
i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n s  




2  (t)  = (xo-8_) e -"t+- C ; l i m 2 ( t ) = x W - -  C > 0  t+'0 
- u t  q"n A qUn t ( t )  = K ( x o - 2 _ ) e  +- C , l i m  < ( t)  = <, = > 0  
t- 
A 
where 2_, c W ,  Qw d en o t e  o p t i m a l  long-run s o l u t i o n s  and 
i s  a  c o e f f i c i e n t  measur ing t h e  speed  w i t h  which i n f l a t i o n  and 
unemployment approach t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  long-run o p t i m a l  v a l u e s .  
This speed attains its maximal value when r+O: 
L 
'max 
= lim u =T 
r+O 92 
The ratio of this maximal speed to the depreciation rate r 
u 
max - C v=--- 
r 1 
'92 
or, more precisely, its squared value v2, plays an important role 
as a basic aggregated parameter in the analysis that follows. 
Observe, for example, that the ratio u/r, as specified by (28), 
1 -
2 1 2 2 is a function of v alone, ~/r=~((l+4v ) -1). Suppose the 
depreciation rate r is given and fixed, and the parameter v2 is 
changed by choosing an appropriate weighting coefficient q; if 
2 2 qjm, then v '0, if q+O, then v jm. The graph of u/r as a func- 
tion of v2 is given in Figure 1. 
Too slow I Reasonable I Too high 
control I results I sensitivity 
I 
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Figure 1. Dependence of the relative speed of control u/r, on 
C the aggregated parameter v2 = T. 
r q 
Since  a  reasonable  va lue  of t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  r a t e  i s  r = 0 . 1 /  
y e a r ,  parameter va lues  t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  a  r a t i o  u / r c  1 might be 
cons idered  a s  n o t  accep tab le  s o c i a l l y :  t h e  speed of approaching 
long-term s o l u t i o n s  i s  t o o  slow i n  such a  case .  The r a t i o  u / r = l  
2 2 i s  obta ined  by v = 2 ,  U / r = 4  by v =20. We s h a l l  show t h a t  a l l  
p o l i c i e s  become very s e n s i t i v e  t o  modeling e r r o r s  ( i . e . ,  become 
r a t h e r  imprac t i cab le )  f o r  v 2  much l a r g e r  than  20, whi le  they  r e -  
C1 
main r o b u s t  f o r  v L  between 2 and 20. For t h i s  range of param- 
1 
e t e r s  ( v 2  - > 2 )  we can a l s o  reasonably approximate U by U =C/qy max 
and U / r  by v ( s e e  t h e  appendix) .  
The op t imal  va lue  of t h e  we l f a re  f u n c t i o n a l  (10)  can be 
determined a s  a  q u a d r a t i c  func t ion  of xo-9, 
where 
The term s t a n d s  f o r  s o c i a l  we l f a re  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  0 
( c h a r a c t e r i z e d ,  a s  noted above, by t h e  absence of e x p e c t a t i o n a l  
e r r o r s )  AG i s  t h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  approximation of we l f a re  l o s s e s  
due t o  an i n i t i a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  ( c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  d i f f e r -  
ence between t h e  i n i t i a l  and long-run op t imal  r a t e  of expected 
2 i n f l a t i o n ) ,  and A W i s  t h e  second-order approximation of such 
l o s s e s .  S i m p l i s t i c  modeling o r  imper fec t  in format ion  i n c r e a s e  
such l o s s e s  f u r t h e r ;  however, t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  l o s s e s  a r e  always 
of second-order form and s h a l l  be t h u s  compared wi th  t h e  
2A t e r m  A W. 
Moreover, t h e  maximal va lue  of t h e  Hamiltonian f u n c t i o n ,  
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  shadow p r i c e  f o r  pas s ing  t i m e  i s  
Before proceeding to the definition of alternative policy 
rules, consider the following short-hand description of our 
basic and extended models. Define the vectors of parameters 
which distinguish the extended from the basic model as 
and let Gn=un+f3. The extended model is 
-rt(l-;x2 (t) -?U2 (t))dt w=[ e 
2 subject to P(t) = -C(u(t-T) - u - B - $(u(t-.r) - u - B) 1 .  
. n n 
We denote this model by M(a). - Clearly, the extended model 
is identical to the basic model (11) if a=a. We denote the basic 
- - 
model by M(a). - The variables of the basic model depend on the 
parameter a and will be denoted B(t,a),Q(t,a), etc. We approach 
- - - 
the solution to the extended model as that of the basic model 
through techniques related to the implicit function theorem. 
Now consider alternative policies, all of which are optimal 
when applied to the basic model, but which might yield different 
solutions when applied to the extended one. The simplest policy 
is the open-loop optimal control: 
obtained from the basic model and applied to the extended one. 
Another policy is the classical closed-loop optimal control 
defined by a function Q(t,a) - which depends solely on the current 
S(t,a) - and not on the initial value x,. When comparing (25) , 
CK (27) it is easy to see that Q(t,a)= -jt(t,a) + (1-rK) u when 
- q - n' 
implementing t h i s  p o l i c y  r u l e  i n  t h e  ex tended  model,  however, 
E t ( t , a )  - i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  by expec ted  i n f l a t i o n  x ( t )  t a k e n  from t h e  
ex tended  model. Thus,  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  c l o s e d - l o o p  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  
i s  
uC ( x ( t )  ,a) = s x  (t) + ( 1 - r K )  un 
9 (39)  
Another  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  i s  t h e  o p t i m a l  t r a j e c t o r y  t r a c k -  
i n g  c o n t r o l :  
t 
u  ( x ( t )  ,a) = { U  (t) such t h a t  x ( t )  = S ( t , a )  - 1 (40)  
whicn means t h a t  t h e  r a t e  of  e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  x ( t )  which 
emerges from t h e  ex tended  model i s  m a i n t a i n e d  a t  t h e  p r e -  
de te rmined  p a t h  S ( t , a ) .  - 
A l l  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y  r u l e s  (38)  , ( 3 9 )  , (40)  a r e  
members o f  an  i n f i n i t e  f a m i l y  of  c losed- loop  c o n t r o l s  parameter -  
i z e d  by a  c o e f f i c i e n t  A :  
X 0  X I f  A = O ,  t h e n  u  ( x ( t )  ,a) = u  ( t , ~ )  . I f  X = l ,  t n e n  u  ( x ( t )  ,a) = 
uC ( x  ( t)  ,a) . If t h e  ex tended  model (37)  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  
p o l i c y  r u l e  (41)  remain s t a b l e  a s  A+. which can be shown t o  be 
X t h e  c a s e  i f  T = O ,  t h e n  it i s  e a s y  t o  check t h a t  u  ( x ( t ) , a )  - + 
t 
u  ( x ( t )  , a ) .  
For i n t e r m e d i a t e  v a l u e s  of  A ,  however, w e  have a  p a r a m e t r i c  
p o l i c y  r u l e  which d i c t a t e s  t h a t  a  l i n e a r  combinat ion  o f  unemploy- 
ment and e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n ,  obse rved  from t h e  ex tended  model,  
C * K  x  (t) f o l l o w  t h e  p rede te rmined  p a t h  8 (t .  a )  ~ ( t )  - A  -
'1 - CK 
- A  - - B ( t , a ) .  
9 - 
Aside  from t h i s  i n f i n i t e  number of  p o l i c y  r u l e s ,  t h e s e  a r e  
y e t  f u r t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  S i n c e  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  maximizes 
t h e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  ( 1 6 )  , t h e  p o l i c y  maker may employ i n  
t h e  open-loop Hamil tonian  maximizing feedback (see W i e r z b i c k i  
1977) : 
1 2  2  A 
=argmax (1--x i t ) - $ u  ( t)  - ~ ( t , a )  * f ( u ( t ) , a ) )  2  
w i tn  u ( t )  , x ( t )  a r e  t aken  from t h e  extended model, and f  ( u ( t )  ,g) 
= k ( t )  i s  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  of s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  a s  measured i n  t h e  
extended model. I n  o t h e r  words, w e  compute t h e  va lue  of t h e  
c u r r e n t  we l f a re  f u n c t i o n  and, us ing  t h e  P h i l l i p s  curve of t h e  
extended model a s  we l l  a s  t h e  shadow p r i c e  f o r  t h e  accumulation 
of i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t ( t , a )  - , we maximize t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  c u r r e n t  we l f a re  and t h e  c o s t  of f u t u r e  i n f l a t i o n .  
However, w e  need n o t  use  a  predetermined shadow p r i c e  ' t (t  , - a )  ; 
s i n c e  we a l s o  know i t s  c lose- loop  form t ( t , a )  - = & ( t , a )  - + M I  we 
could a l s o  use  t h e  measured x ( t )  f o r  c o r r e c t i o n s  of  t h i s  shadow 
p r i c e .  This  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  closed-loop Hamiltonian maximizing 
feedback: 
1 2  2  
= argmax ( l - T ~  (t) - $ u  (t) - LKx ( t )  + H) f (u  (t) I : )  ) 
u( t) 
The Hamiltonian f u n c t i o n  ( 1 6 )  can a l s o  be r e w r i t t e n  i n  a  d i f f e r -  
e n t  form. For example, t h e  r e l a t i o n  
1 2  2  l - Z ~  (t)  - 3 u  ( t )  
u f o ( t  (tIa) , t t ( t I g )  ,a) = argmax 
u ( t )  ? ( t , ~ )  = f  ( u ( t )  Ia)+t t ( t Ia)  
y i e l d s  a l s o  u f O ( t ( t I a )  , tT ( t , a )  ,a) = G ( t , a )  - a t  - a=a; - whi le  it might 
y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n  when - a f a .  - Thi s  i s  t h e  open-loop, 
b e n e f i t - c o s t  c o n t r o l .  Observe t h a t  i f  t ( t , a )=O would ho ld ,  t -  
then  t ( t , a )  - would n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  maximization i n  ( 4 4 )  and t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  ufo ( t  ( t ,  - a )  ,0  ,a) =G (t,a) - would be op t imal  f o r  t h e  ex- 
tended model no ma t t e r  what e r r o r s  a f a  were made i n  t h e  b a s i c  
- - 
model. Thus, t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c o n t r o l  i s  p e r f e c t l y  r o b u s t  i f  
t h e  c o s t  of pass ing  t ime i s  n e g l i g i b l e .  However, i n  t h e  example 
A 
considered here, ct(tIa) - # O  and it will be shown that this con- 
trol policy has some undesirable properties. 
If tt(t,a) #0, then the errors in determining the shadow 
prices can be corrected in a close-loop structure 
1 2  (t)-qu 2 (t, 
= argmax (45) 
u(t) (Kx(t)+Ml f (u(t) ,a)+tt(x(t) - tg )  
where (x(t) ,a) is determined as in (35) but with u!t) and (t) t - 
substituted by (17) , (20) ; x (t) is taken from the extended model. 
Clearly, it would be possible to generate yet other policy 
rules, each involving observations from variables from the ex- 
tended model and a scheme for influencing these variables which 
is basic-optimal (i.e., yield optimal solutions whenever - a=a). - 
However, we restrict our attention to the policy rules listed 
above. If the probability distributions of the model parameters 
were known, then a dual stochastic optimal control and estima- 
tion problem could be formulated and possibly solved. Yet, 
such problems are notoriously difficult. In this paper we 
concentrate on the derivation of policy rules when the param- 
eter distributions are not known. Such conditions call for a 
different methodology, to which the following section is devoted. 
4. METHODOLOGY OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
i Consider a given policy rule u , mapping the variables 
measured in the extended model into the control actions for this 
model. This policy is defined with the help of the basic model 
and thus depends on parameters - a (see Figure 2). 
Suppose it is at least conceptually possible to solve the 
i 
extended model under this policy rule, thus obtaining x (t,a,a) - - 
i 
and u (t,a,a); - - these results depend on the policy rule i as well 
as on the parameters - a,a. - Similarly, suppose we could compute 
the social welfare functional of the extended model under this 
policy rule: 
If we were able to optimize the extended model and compute 
the corresponding social welfare functional fi (a) - , we would find 
that wi (a, a) < fi (a) , since the differences between the basic 
- - -  - 
model and the extended one (a - # - a) imply that the policy rule 
may not be optimal for the extended model. Thus, as a measure 
of the robustness of a policy rule, we use the welfare loss of 
applying this rule to the extended model: 
However, since the extended model is more complicated than 
A 
the basic one, a direct computation of W(a) - and si (a,a) - - may be 
impossible. On the other hand, the function si (a,a) - - has several 
useful properties that facilitate its approximation even i f  only 
the solutions of the basic model, but not those of  the extended model are 
i hm. First, S (a, - - a) is non-negative: 
i 
si (oi,a) L 0 ; S (2,~) = 0 for all - a = - a
Therefore, if si is differentiable, its first-order derivatives 
are zero for all a=a: 
- - 
It follows further (see Wierzbicki 1977) that if si is twice 
differentiable, its second-order derivatives have a specific 
symmetry property: 
i There fo re ,  S ( a , a )  - - can be approximated by 
where o ( - )  i s  a f u n c t i o n  converging t o  ze ro  f a s t e r  t h a n  i t s  
~i 
argument. A s  a n e x t  s t e p ,  w e  need a method f o r  computing S a a .  
i - - I f  w e  could  approximate t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between x ( t , a , a ) ,  - - 
u i ( t f a f a )  and P ( t , a )  - , C ( t , a )  - which would be op t ima l  f o r  t h e  ex- 
tended model 
t hen  w e  could  e a s i l y  12) de te rmine  t h e  q u a d r a t i c  form of t h e  
approximat ion (51)  : 
13)  However, xi (t)  and ;i (t)  , c a l l e d  extended structural variations , 
a r e  u s u a l l y  n o t  d i r e c t l y  computable. I t  i s  u s u a l l y  s imp le r  t o  
compute t h e  basic structural variations 
i 
x (tf2,a) - f ( t , a ) =  - x i ( t )  (2-5) + o (  1 ~ a - ~ l  - 1 )  
(54)  
ui (trnra) - Q(t ,a)  = ii (t)  (a -a )  - - + o ( 1 ( E - a l  I ) . 
These approximate t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  extended model (un- 
de rg iven  p o l i c y  r u l e ,  o r  i n  g iven  control structure) and t h e  o p t i -  
mal s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  b a s i c  mode. W e  wish t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  ex- 
tended s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s ,  i n  ( 5 3 ) ,  v i a  t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  
v a r i a t i o n s  minus t h e  b a s i c  op t ima l  v a r i a t i o n s :  
For  t h i s  purpose ,  w e  must compute t h e  b a s i c  o p t i m a l  v a r i a t i o n s :  
Q ( t 1 a )  - - Q ( t , a )  - = u ( t ) -  (a -a )  - - + o ( l  la-a1 - - 1 )  
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  among t h e  o p t i m i z a t i o n s  o f  t h e  b a s i c  
model, t h e  ex tended  model,  and t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  b a s i c  model 
under  g i v e n  p o l i c y  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  2 .  The u s e f u l n e s s  
o f  t h e  method above l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  although the extended model 
might be d i f f i c u l t  t o  optimize or t o  solve exp l i c i t l y  mder given policy rule,  
the variational equations that  determine the basic optimal variations and 
basic structural variations are usually much simpler thun the extended model 
i t s e l f .  The r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n a l  e q u a t i o n s  a r e  s o l v e d  
a l o n g  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  b a s i c  model, a t  t h e  pa ramete r  v a l u e  - a .  
For  example, i f  t h e  ex tended  model c o n t a i n s  d e l a y e d  v a r i a b l e s ,  
t h e  v a r i a t i o n a l  e q u a t i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  d e l a y  
a r e  n o t  d e l a y e d  themse lves .  
Observe now t h a t  i f  a  i s  a  column v e c t o r  o f  p  p a r a m e t e r s ,  
- 
iri (t)  and iii (t)  a r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  row v e c t o r s  o f  p  v a r i a t i o n s  c o r r e -  
i T  
sponding t o  t h e s e  pa ramete r  changes;  t h u s  x  (t)  xi ( t )  and 
i 
uiT ( t )  u (t)  a r e  pxp m a t r i c e s .  The m a t r i x  .?: a t h u s  h a s  t h e  
14  - - form 
I n  o r d e r  t o  a n a l y s e  f u l l y  t h e  approx imat ion  ( 5 1 ) ,  w e  s h o u l d  
a c t u a l l y  compute t h e  m a t r i x  6; a , e s t i m a t e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  some 
- - 
bounds on t h e  changes  - a-a ,  - and approximate  upper  bounds f o r  (51)  
by e i g e n v a l u e  a n a l y s i s .  Though such  an  a n a l y s i s  i s  s t r a i g h t f o r -  
ward, y e t ,  f o r  t h e  s a k e  of  s i m p l i c i t y ,  w e  s h a l l  o n l y  compute t h e  
d i a g o n a l  e l e m e n t s  o f  8: a , u s e  some upper  bounds on t h e  e l e m e n t s  
- - 
o f  - a-a ,  - and compare t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  each  e lement  of  t h i s  v e c t o r  
independen t ly .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  w e  do 
n o t  wish t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on j o i n t  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  changes  o f  v a r i -  
o u s  components of - a .  R a t h e r ,  w e  would l i k e  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  
s e p a r a t e  e f f e c t s  o f  e a c h  p o l i c y  r u l e  on t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  
approximation. It will be shown that these effects differ widely 
from one policy rule to the other. 15 
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Figure 2. Block-diagram representation of the relations between 
the basic model, an extended model together with a policy rule, 
and an optimized extended model. 
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5. COMPARISON OF POLICY RULES ON EXTENDED MODELS 
5a. Bounds of Parameter Changes 
Optimization ? 
Optimization Difference: of the Extended 
of the Basic Model p
Basic Opt~mal Model M (a) Variations 
If the methods discussed here were to be applied empirical- 
ly, bounds on parameter changes f 3 , y , ~  would have to be estimated 
by econometric methods. In this theoretical paper, however, we 
simply assume relative bounds on these parameters. The assumed 






Conclusions: Extended Model 
Policy Rules - 
ui(x(t), 4 , ? I  
i . e . ,  t h e  e r r o r  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  u  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d ive rgence  
n '  
between t h e  a c t u a l  and long-term expec t ed  r a t e s  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  
and t h u s  a l s o  t o  t h e  d ive rgence  between t h e  a c t u a l  and n a t u r a l  
C 
r a t e  o f  unemployment ( s i n c e  @=ii -u and u  =On, =-Stm see t h e  
n  n  n  Sq a p p e n d ix ) .  W e  assume a l s o  t h a t  t h e  e r r o r  i n  yun i s  of  s i m i l a r  
n a t u r e  
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  t h e  d e l a y  T w e  assume a  r e l a t i v e  bound 
T - 1 -d 
max 4umax - 4C 
s i n c e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  an  over looked  d e l a y  T a r e  charac -  
t e r i z e d  by t h e  number U T  (see t h e  a p p e n d i x ) .  
5b. S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  E r r o r s  i n  E s t i m a t i n g  N a t u r a l  
Unemployment Rate  
I n  t h i s  s imp le  c a s e  w e  know t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
ex tended  model, j u s t  s u b s t i t u t i n g  u  by an i n  (25) , ( 2 6 ) ,  ( 2 7 ) .  
n  
Thus, t h e  b a s i c  o p t i m a l  v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  o b t a i n e d  immedia te ly  
w i t h  B = i i  -u w e  assume B f O ,  y=O, T = O  i n  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  and 
n  n'  
d e n o t e  k ( t , a ) = S ( t , B ) ,  - G ( t , a ) = Q ( t , B )  - i n  t h i s  c a s e .  The b a s i c  
s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  depend on an  assumed p o l i c y  r u l e .  Con- 
s i d e r  f i r s t  t h e  f a m i l y  o f  c losed- loop  c o n t r o l s  (41)  and s u b s t i -  
t u t e  it i n t o  t h e  ex tended  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  (12)  t o  o b t a i n  (assum- 
i n g  C=C) : 
. X X 
x  ( t ) = - C ( U  t)  - u n ) = - c ( Q ( t , a ) - f i  " - n  + ~ - ( x  CK (=I x ( t , a ) ) )  - ; 
X 
x  ( 0 )  = x 0  (62)  
Again, i n  t h i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  c a s e  w e  can s o l v e  t h e  ex tended  
model a n a l y t i c a l l y :  
and de te rmine  t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  
i ( x A  ( t)  - f ( t , a ) )  = iiA(t) = A- (1 - e - A u t  ACK 1 
1 .  A - A  - A u t  
- (u  ( t)  - Q ( t , a ) )  = u  (t)  = 1 - e  B - 
which, i n  t u r n ,  i m p l y  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  (61)  , (56) t h e  extended 
s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  
Now w e  can compute t h e  second-order  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  
A l o s s e s  S ( a , a )  - - w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  8: 
A I n  t h i s  s imple  c a s e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  S ( a , a )  - - i s  a q u a d r a t i c  
f u n c t i o n  o f  6 ;  hence t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  B a r e  
2 A A  . I n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a  c o e f f i c i e n t  of  r o b u s t n e s s  which 7B S B ~  
does n o t  depend on u n i t s  o f  measurement, w e  use  t h e  r a t i o  o f  
2 
'ma, and a26' ( t h e  r a t i o  o f  l o s s e s  due t o  i n e x a c t  pa ramete r  B B 
e s t i m a t i o n  t o  n a t u r a l  l o s s e s  due t o  an i n i t i a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  
If X=O, for the open-loop policy, this robustness coefficient 
takes the form 
For A=l, the classical closed-loop policy, we obtain 
and for A+a, the optimal trajectory tracking policy: 
We can also determine the feedback coefficient that minimizes B 
(67) and thus provides for the best robustness in this policy 
family: 
All these results depend on the parameters rK, which are deter- 
c2 mined, via (23) , by the parameters - = v2, the squared ratio 
r q 




to the time discount rate r. Thus, when analysing 1' 
q' 




v2 instead of r ~ = (  l+lv2)' - 1)/2v . 
A X  F igure  3. Dependence of t h e  robus tness  c o e f f i c i e n t  R on v 2 
and A .  B 
The graphs of 2' a s  a func t ion  of v2 and A ,  presen ted  i n  B 
Figure  3 i n d i c a t e  d ramat ic  changes of robustness--upto l o 3  t imes 
and over--depending on t h e  choice  of A. Thi s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  
i n  t n e  fo l lowing  way. When t h e  a t tempt  t o  main ta in  p r e c i s e l y  a 
predetermined p a t h  of unemployment ( a t  X = O )  o r  a predetermined 
pa th  of expected i n f l a t i o n  ( a t  X-) i s  made, even s l i g h t  e r r o r s  
i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e  n a t u r a l  unemployment r a t e  un can r e s u l t  
i n  l a r g e  we l f a re  l o s s e s .  However, i f  an a p p r o p r i a t e  combination 
CK 
of unemployment and expected i n f l a t i o n ,  Q ( t , a ) - X  - - 8(t,5) wi th  
9 
h c l o s e  t o  i i s  chosen a s  a po l i cy  t a r g e t ,  smal l  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  B ' 
e v a l u a t i o n  of u do n o t  cause  s i g n i f i c a n t  we l f a re  l o s s e s .  W e ,  
n 
however, s e e  t h a t  even t h e  choice  of X cannot  reduce we l f a re  
l o s s e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y ,  i f  t h e  parameter v2 becomes much l a r g e r  
than  20--which would correspond t o  t h e  d e s i r e  of o b t a i n i n g  f a s t  
r e s u l t s  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  i n f l a t i o n  (h igh  v / r ,  s e e  F igure  1) by 
a t t a c h i n g  a smal l  weight q t o  unemployment. 
Consider now the open-loop Hamiltonian maximizing policy: 
1 2  2 
= argmax (l-rx it) - 9 u  (t) + t(t,a) C (u(t) -Gn)) 
u(t) 2 
The fact that we measure the accurate current speed of change of 
- inflationary expectations, k (t) = -C ( u (t) - un) , does not inf lu- 
ence the maximization in (72); no matter what Gn is taken, we 
obtain 
Thus, the open-loop Hamiltonian maximizing policy is equivalent 
to the simple open-loop policy, if no changes of the functional 
form of the Phillips curve are considered. Similarly, it can 
be shown for this case that 
the closed-loop Hamiltonian maximizing policy is equivalent to 
the classical closed-loop policy. Since the simple open-loop 
and the classical closed-loop are not the best choices from our 
given set of policy options, it is not desirable to pursue 
Hamiltonian maximizing policies. 
The benefit-to-cost optimizing policies perform even more 
poorly. 3y setting f (u (t) ,g) = -C (u (t) -un-8) and computing the 
maximum of (43) we obtain16) 
f 0 fo A 1 2  
where u (t)=u (~(t.2). St(t,a) .a) - and U(%,Q.a)=l- - T f  .(t,g) 
- 9Q2 (t,a) for the sake of notational economy; xfO (t) denotes 2 - 
here the state x(t) measured in the extended model under the 
p o l i c y  r u l e  (75)  . Now, i f  we s u b s t i t u t e  (75)  i n t o  t h e  extended 
£0 £0 
model R (t) = -C ( u  (t)  -un-B) , we o b t a i n  a  non l inea r  d i f f e r e n -  
t i a l  equa t ion  
A s  noted i n  t h e  preceding s e c t i o n ,  we do n o t  have t o  s o l v e  t h i s  
£0 
equa t ion .  I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  l i n e a r i z e  it i n  B a t  B=0, x  ( t )=  
- 
17 8 ( t , a )  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  equa t ions  f o r  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  . 
2 
' £0 Q ( t , a ) S ( t , a )  - - :fo qu (tta) 
x  (t)  = C  ( t )  + c (  U(8.Q.a) + 1  ; u (B,Q,a) 
- fo  qfi2 (tra) Q ( t , a ) f  - ( t , a )  - -fo 
u  (t)  = -  - u(Q,Q,a) u (Q,Q,a) x  (t) 
When t a k i n g  i n t o  account  (56)  , (61)  , we d e r i v e  a l s o  t h e  equa t ions  
f o r  extended s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  
The d i f f e r e n t i a l  equa t ions  i n  both (77)  and (78)  a r e  u n s t a b l e  i f  
u(A,Q,a)>O - which occurs  when f t ( t , a ) , C i ( t , a )  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
- - 
smal l .  Thus, a l s o  t h e  equa t ion  (76)  i s  uns t ab l e18 )  , i f  
U ( k , Q , a ) > 0 .  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  b e n e f i t - t o - c o s t  maximizing 
p o l i c y  i n v a r i a b l y  l e a d s  t o  u n s t a b l e  r e s u l t s  wherever t h e r e  a r e  
e r r o r s  i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  unemployment r a t e .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h i s  does  n o t  imply t h a t  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  under  
t h i s  p o l i c y  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f i n i t e ;  it might  be f i n i t e  i f  r>>  
Q ( t , a ) A ( t , a )  - 
u ( A I Q I a !  f o r  a l l  t. However, even i n  such a  c a s e ,  when 
- f o  - £0 
computing x  ( t ) ,  u  (t) under somewhat s i m p l i f y i n g  assumpt ion 
t h a t  ~ ~ = 2 ~  (see t h e  appendix)  it can  be shown t h a t  
which i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  under t h e  b e n e f i t - t o - c o s t  
maximizing p o l i c y  i s  l a r g e r  t han  under t h e  s imple  open-loop 
p o l i c y .  S i n ce  a  s i m i 1 a r : r e s u l t  can  be d e r i v e d  f o r  t h e  c lo sed -  
l o o p  b e n e f i t - t o - c o s t  maximizing p o l i c y ,  w e  conclude t h a t  t h e s e  
p o l i c i e s  a r e  n o t  d e s i r a b l e  ways o f  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  problems o f  
i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment w i t h i n  o u r  a n a l y t i c a l  c o n t e x t .  19 )  
5c.  S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  Mis taken F u n c t i o n a l  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
W e  assume h e r e  t h a t  - a=(O ,y ,O) ,  i . e . ,  t h e  ex tended  model 
t a k e s  t h e  form: 
The problem of maximizing (10)  s u b j e c t  t o  (80) does  n o t  admi t  an  
a n a l y t i c  s o l u t i o n ;  however, t h i s  problem h a s  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  s u f -  
f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l  y  and t h e s e  s o l u t i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  i n  y .  
T h i s  can be s een  by w r i t i n g  t h e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h i s  
problem 
and t h e  n ece s sa r y  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  o p t i m a l i t y  
and obse rv in g  t h a t  t h e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  remains  concave f o r  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s ma l l  y and a  cor responding  R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n  ha s  a  
backward s t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  which depends d i f f e r e n t i a b l y  on t h e  
pa ramete r  y; s i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o f  ( 8 4 ) ,  (82)  depend t h e n  
d i f f e r e n t i a b l y  on y. However, w e  omi t  t h e s e  d e t a i l s  h e r e ,  and 
show o n l y  how t o  d e r i v e  b a s i c  v a r i a t i o n a l  e q u a t i o n s .  
, . 




+ o ( y )  ,~(t,~)=S(t,a)+yZ(t)+o(y), - c ( t , y ) = ? ( t , g ) + ~ t ( t ) + o ( ~ )  and 
rewrite t h e  e q u a t i o n s  (82)  , (83)  , (84)  a s  
S i n c e  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  squa re  b r a c k e t s  a r e  zeros--cf .  ( 1 7 ) ,  
( 1  8)  , ( 1 9 )  --we s u b d iv id e  t h e  remainders  by y  and l e t  y+O t o  
o b t a i n  
C A 
since - r; (t, - a) =Q (t, - a) ; the last equation is obtained by taking 
into account (88). Observe that, if Q(t,a)=un, under initial 
A A 
- 
equilibrium conditions, then t(t)~0, ;(t)-0. If Q(t,g)-un 
increases, which might be caused by an increase of xO-kmf then 
A A 
also (t) and ; (t) will, in general, increase. Thus, the sensi- 
tivity of optimal solutions to the parameter y increases with 
the distance from equilibrium. While it is possible to solve 
the equations (89), (90) in their general form, we can signifi- 
cantly simplify computations by assuming approximately that 
Q(t,a)-u - = u that is, by solving these equations at a stan- 
n n' 
dard distance from equilibrium. In this case, we obtain 
Consider now the family of closed-loop policies (41). The 
extended model equation under these policies takes the form 
X KC A (t) =-C(Q(t,g) -un+X- (X (t) -k(t,g)) 
9 
Again, the solutions of this equation are differentiable func- 
X X 
tions of y, x (t)=2(t,a)+yxh - (t)+~(~). u (t)=O.(t.a)+y;A (t)+o(y) . 
When linearizing (92) by the same technique as applied for (82), 
(83), (84) , we obtain 
ZA 1 
K~~ ;A (t) + C (Q(t.a) - un) x (t) = - A  -
- ; xA(0)=O ci 
Under the approximative assumption Q (t, - a) -u % un, (93) yields 
n 
-A 1 u 3  - -A 
x (t) a (l-e 1 2  hut) ; u (t) a - u  (I-e 2 n (94) 1 
The basic structural variations xA(t) (t) and the basic opti- 
A A 
ma1 variations z(t) ,u(t) determine extended structural variations 
(t) , 1 u2 3 (- I (1-e - 5 ( -e-Ut) ) 2 n C ArK 
and, in turn, the second-order derivative of the welfare loss 
A dimensionless robustness coefficient is 
and it takes the following forms for A=O (open-loop policy), 
A=l (classical closed-loop policy) and A- (optimal trajectory 
tracking) : 
The feedback coefficient ^A that minimizes (97) , thus providing Y 
for the most robust policy from this family, can be determined as 
Similarly as in the previous subsection, we represent these 
- - 
- 
l-rK rather than rK results as a function of the parameter v =- 
(see Figure 4). The dependence of the robgskess coefficient 
..A R on h is rather weak--except for larger v2, when the application 
Y 
^ A  Figure 4. Dependence of the Robustness coefficient R on v2 and A. 
Y 
of X 4 ^X is not advisable. 
Y 
A A 
However, since h  > A  (see Figure 4a) and Rh does not rise 
A B Y Y 
steeply for X > X - ,  , we may. presume that the feedback coefficient X 
'I 
should be chosen to i to provide for greater robustness with B 
respect to the uncertainty about natural unemployment rate than 
with respect to the uncertainty about the functional form of the 
Phillips curve. 
A A 
A simplified form for a compromise X (that is close to X 
A A A  13 
but satisfies X < X < A  ) can be obtained by assuming 
Y B 
A 
(see Figure 5a). If this particular X is chosen, then the 
A CK A CK policy target Q(t,a)-A - - Si(t, a)= u(t)- X - x(t) can be 
q - q 
A A 
Figuse 5. a) Comparison of Optimal Feedback Coefficients X A ,  
and X 6' 
Y' A A 
A 
b) Comparison of Robustness Coefficients f ih  and R at h=h and of 
the Relative Speed u/r of Controlling 1nflition ~Zwards Its Long- 
term Value. 
transformed to the form 
where 
This means that a robust policy is to choose money supply 
rate m as to keep the combination of unemployment and the ex- 
C pected inflation, u(t)- -x(t), at the predeter~ined tgajectory 
C r q A X  E (un- - xO) e-Ut. The robustness coefficients Rh and R corres- 
r q B 2  y 
ponding to this policy are shown as functions of v in Figure 5b; 
u parallel to this, Figure 5b also displays the coefficient 7 -- 
the relative speed of controlling inflation towards its long- 
term value--from Figure 1. 
The graphs in Figure 4b should be interpreted as follows. 
Once a coefficient X and thus a robust policy form has been 
chosen, the robustness coefficients depend on basic parameters 
of the model. The aggregate parameter v2 can be inversely in- 
fluenced by the choice of weighting coefficient q at the un- 
employment rate u (t) in the social welfare functional (1 0) . If 
this coefficient is large enough, such that the resulting v2 is 
small, say, vL<2, - then the attainable robustness coefficients 
CI 
are quite good. However, for vL<2 - we have the relative speed 
u/r<l, - which means that we control inflation slower than the 
time discount rate--a solution that is socially not acceptable. 
2 To increase the relative speed, we must go to v >2; at v2=20 
we obtain u/r=4, which with r=O.l/year would give u=0.4/yearI 
still a moderate speed of controlling inflation (a reduction of 
circa 40% of the original distance x0-Bm in a year). However, 
the robustness of the solution suffers from the choice of the 
higher relative speed. If some impetous decision-maker would 
promise his electorate to bring the inflation down in a year 
(say to. achieve u/ralO) he would have to go as far as to v2a100, 
where the robustness coefficients are rather bad; errors in model 
specification might then easily result in social welfare losses 
several times higher than the social welfare losses due to the 
initial difference xo-2, 
Admittedly, the results shown in Figure 5b are based on the 
assumed bounds 161max and IyImax. While these bounds do not in- 
fluence the conclusions on the choice of the feedback parameter 
A ,  they do influence the actual values of robustness coefficients. 
Thus, an impetous decision-maker could require more precise 
econometric estimations of the bounds on parameter uncertainty. 
Our theoretical exercise does not permit us to draw conclusions 
about the desirable degree of accuracy for parameter evaluations; 
it provides only possible guidelines for the econometric pursuit 
of such conclusions. However, given an attainable degree of 
accuracy, the results will have the same qualitative character: 
the faster we try to achieve the long-term goals, the more sen- 
sitive to model errors are the results of our policy. 
For the sake of brevity, we omit here the discussion of 
Hamiltonian-maximizing and benefit-to-cost maximizing policies, 
although the former policies might make sense in the case of a 
mistaken functional speicification. 
5d. Sensitivity to Delays 
We assume here - a=(O,0,~), that is, the extended model takes 
the form 
x(0) =xo , u(t) - given for t€[-r;O) (105) 
The problem of maximizing (10) subject to (105) is, in fact, not 
very difficult to solve (see the appendix). However, this is 
due to the special form of the problem and we shall proceed as 
if we did not know its explicit solutions. We can do so, be- 
cause we know its solutions if T=O (the basic model solutions) 
and we need only linear approximations of its solutions for 
smal l  T .  We denote  t h e  'unknown' s o l u t i o n s  by f ( t , ~ ) ,  Q ( ~ , T ) ,  
h 
5 (t  , T )  ; assuming t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  
A 
2 0 )  i n  T a t  A T = O ,  we 
p o s t u l a t e  2 ( t , ~ )  A = f ( t , a ) + ~ x ( t ) + o ( ~ )  - Q ( ~ , T )  = a ( t , a ) + ~ u ( t ) + o ( ~ )  - , 
A 
5 ( t , ~ ) = ;  ( t , a ) + ~ T ( t ) + o ( ~ ) .  - 
The necessary  c o n d i t i o n s  of o p t i m a l i t y  f o r  problems wi th  
de l ays  i n  c o n t r o l  ( s e e ,  f o r  example, Wierzbicki  1970) r e q u i r e  
t h a t  t h e  fo l lowing  s h i f t e d  Hamiltonian func t ion  i s  maximized 
where t h e  de l ay  i n  c o n t r o l  i s  compensated by a  forward t ime 
s h i f t  (of  both  5 (t) and u ( t - T )  ) ; t h e  a d j o i n t  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  
shadow p r i c e  ~ ( t ) ,  however, remains i n  i t s  c l a s s i c a l  form i f  
t h e r e  i s  no de l ay  i n  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s .  Thus, t h e  necessary  con- 
d i t i o n s  of o p t i m a l i t y  a r e :  
2 ( 0 . r )  = x g  , Q ( t , r )  - given f o r  t ~ [ - r ; O )  
C Now s u b t r a c t  t h e  terms Q ( t , a )  = - 5 ( t , a )  from both  s i d e s  of 
- 9: - (107) and use  t h e  p o s t u l a t e d  forms of Q ( ~ , T )  , % ( t , ~ )  t o  o b t a i n :  
A 
When subdiv id ing  by T and l e t t i n g  T + O  (observe t h a t  < ( t , O ) =  
A 
< ( t , a ) )  - t h e  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  b a s i c  op t imal  c o n t r o l  v a r i a t i o n  i s  
obta ined :  
The same technique can be used f o r  d e r i v i n g  t h e  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  
b a s i c  op t imal  s t a t e  v a r i a t i o n ,  which t a k e s  t h e  form 
whi le  t h e  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  b a s i c  op t imal  c o s t a t e  v a r i a t i o n  i s  
e a s i l y  de r ived  a s  
. A - A A 
< (t) = rt (t) - ;; (t) 
A l l  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n a l  equa t ions  do not contain delayed terms, a l -  
though they  approximate a  problem wi th  de l ays ;  they  a r e  t h e r e -  
f o r e  easy  t o  so lve .  
C =. Observe now t h a t  C i ( t , a ) = - s ( t , a ) ;  - s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  equa- 
q 
t i o n  i n t o  ( I l l ) ,  ( 1 1 2 ) ,  we o b t a i n :  
S ince  t h e  system of equa t ions  ( 1 1 3 ) ,  ( 1 1 4 )  i s  homogeneous, i t s  
, , , , 
s o l u t i o n s  a r e  of t h e  form t ( t ) = ~ x ( t )  where K i s  de f ined  a s  i n  
A 
c2 A A A ( 2 1 ) .  ( 2 3 ) ;  b u t  i f  x ( t ) =  ; ; ~ x ( t )  and ~ ( o ) = o ,  then  x ( t ) = 0  and 
A 
- 7 
< ( t ) - 0 .  Thus, we have t h e  b a s i c  op t imal  v a r i a t i o n s  
A 
- 
< (t) = 0 
Consider  now t h e  fami ly  ( 4 1 )  of c losed- loop  p o l i c i e s .  The 
extended model e q u a t i o n  under t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  t a k e s  t h e  form: 
X 
x  (t) - given  by (105) f o r  ~ € [ O ; T ]  ( 1 1 6  
Provided that the equatwn (116) i s  stable, w e  can approximate i t s  
s o l u t i o n  a s  a d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n  of  t i m e .  ay s u b t r a c t i n g  
t h e  b a s i c  model e q u a t i o n  from both  s i d e s  of ( 1 1 6 ) ,  subd iv id ing  
by T and l e t t i n g  r+O, w e  o b t a i n  t h e  equa t ion  f o r  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r -  
a l  v a r i a t i o n s  
which y i e l d s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
and whi le  t a k i n g  i n t o  account  ( 4 1 )  
- A  CK - X  CK 
u-(xo - A _ )  (e  -"t - u t  (119) u  ( t)  =A-x ( t)  =_-  
q  X l  q  - e  1 
Thus, t h e  extended s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  
- X  A - A  - u 
x  ( t)  = x  ( t)  - x ( t )  = -(x - krn) (e  - h u t  - . -u t )  A - 1  0 
( 1 2 0 )  
and t h e  second-order d e r i v a t i v e  of t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  i s  d e t e r -  
mined a s  
2  s A  
T 
^ A  max T T  - R = - ( 1 - r K )  
n2k 4 (rK+2A ( 1 - r K )  ) 
Observe t h a t  t h i s  r o b u s t n e s s  c o e f f i c i e n t  d e c r e a s e s  monoton ica l ly  
A 
w i t h  A .  Hoyever, i f  w e  assume A = A ,  w e  o b t a i n  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  
v a l u e s  o f  kA a s  shown i n  F i g u r e  6 .  
r 
^ A  ^ A  F i g u r e  6 .  Comparison o f  Robustness  C o e f f i c i e n t s  R R and &: 
w i t h  A = X .  B '  T I 
Thus, w e  can conclude t h a t  the omission of delays in the basic 
mdel does not jeopardise the successful application of closed-loop po licies 
to the extended model with delays--provided t h a t  t h e  ex tended  model 
remains  s t a b l e  and t h e  approximat ion of  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  remains  
^ A  
v a l i d  ( o b se r v e  t h a t  a  c o r r e c t l y  computed STT would i n c r e a s e  
s h a r p l y ,  even t o  i n f i n i t y ,  i f  t h e  extended model becomes un- 
s t a b l e ) .  
Therefore, we must investigate stability conditions of the 
equation (116). Since this equation is linear, it is sufficient 
to analyse the stability of its homogeneous part: 
P(t) = -hux(t-r) ; x(t) = 0 for t < 0 , x(0) =xo (123) 
When applying Laplace transformation to both sides of this equa- 
tion, we obtain 
and we can use (see the appendix) the classical Nyquist crite- 
rion for the stability of a feedback system. The result is that 
the equation (116) is stable, if 
(where ~=3.14 ...). Therefore, the use of a sufficiently large 
feedback coefficient X would destroy the stability of the system. 
Moreover, it is known from the classical theory of feedback 
systems, that the condition (125) should be satisfied with 50% 
margin 
Tr 
TU < - 4X (126) 
in order to obtain approximately aperiodic solutions of (116), 
A 
which is necessary for a satisfactory approximation of x (t) by 
2(t,a)+rxX - (t) , since both B(t,a) - and G' (t) are aperiodic. 
We can investigate further the condition (125) if we assume 
A 
X=X, consider as a function (102) of v, i ( v )  = 2v2 2 1 I 1 2 - (1+4~ ) 2 -  1 
U 
consider - as a function of v, - -  
r 
) , and transform the 
r 2 
condition (125) to 
or, if taken with 50% margin 
Since r and r might be taken as given parameters--say, 
r=O.l/year and r=0.25 years as an estimate of delay21--hence the 
inequality (128) specifies really the highest value of the param- 
eter v2 that is admissible for a stable implementation of the 
closed-loop policy (41) with x=X. For example, if r=O.l/year 





=C/qz is higher than this value--say, because of a very small 
weight q related to the unemployment in the social welfare func- 
A 
tional--then the closed-loop policy with X=X is not desirable. 
However, for these high values of v2 all other policies are also 
very sensitive to all types of errors (see Figures 3, 4, 5). 
Thus, if the weight q is small, resulting in relative high speed 
u of controlling inflation or, equivalently, in a hight value of 
2 the parameter v , a monetary control of inflation and unemploy- 
ment cannot really be effective--either because of delayed 
effects endangering stability or because of incomplete informa- 
tion and various modeling errors. 
On the other hand, u, u and v2 can always be diminished 
max 
by increasing the weight q related to the unemployment. After 
all, a relative speed of u =0.56/yearf u=0.5l/year is not that 
-0.51 max 
small: e %0.60, which means that the long-term solution is 
being approached at a rate of circa 40% per year. In short, 
these results suggest that policy directions aimed at achieving 
the long-run target rates of inflation and unemployment rapidly 
run the risk of either inducing instability or becoming partic- 
ularly sensitive to unpredictable modeling errors. Policy 
directions which aim for a slow, gradual achievement of the long- 
run targets have a greater chance of success. 
6. OVERVIEW 
In the analysis above we have presented a methodology for 
the formulation and assessment of macroeconomic policy rules 
under conditions of uncertainty or simplistic modeling. We 
believe that these conditions are prevalent in macroeconomic 
policy making: rarely do policy makers have accurate knowledge 
of the parameter distributions in their models and usually these 
models are recognized as rough approximations of the macroeco- 
nomic phenomena which the policy makers face. The policy maker 
is assumed to know which parts of his macro-economic model may 
be subject to error--which parameter estimates and delay esti- 
mates may be mistaken and which functions may be misspecified-- 
but he does not know how these errors are distributed. 
In this setting, the policy maker formulates a number of 
different policies each of which optimize his objective function 
(viz., the "social welfare function") subject to the constraints 
represented in his model. The policy which is actually chosen 
is the one which makes social welfare minimally sensitive to the 
given modeling errors. This is not a narrowly prescribed, water- 
tight exercise, because the number of policies to choose from is 
limited only by the policy maker's imagination. Our methodology 
does not reduce the policy maker to a spiritless automaton 
which solves a given optimization program over and over again. 
The policy maker always faces the possibility of discovering 
new policy options which may make social welfare even less sen- 
sitive to his modeling errors than the policies he currently 
employs. It does not appear possible to find a universally 
"best" policy with regard to our methodology. All that our 
methodology does is provide criteria for the choice of a policy 
from a given set of candidate policies. 
Tne traditional way of deriving how sensitive social wel- 
fare is to policies derived from modeling errors is (a) to maxi- 
mize social welfare with respect to the "wrong" model and there- 
by derive the "wrong" policy, (b) to maximize social welfare 
with respect to a hypothetically "right" model and thereby de- 
rive the "right" policy, (c) to find the level of social welfare 
associated with the "right" model and the "wrong" policy, and 
(d )  t o  t a k e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between s o c i a l  we l f a re  under (b )  and 
( c ) .  I n  o u r  methodalogy, we e s s e n t i a l l y  fo l low t h i s  way. How- 
e v e r ,  we change t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e  ' r i g h t '  and 'wrong' 
models by r e p l a c i n g  them wi th  'extended '  and ' b a s i c '  models, 
and w e  s i m p l i f y  t h e  s t e p s  ( b ,  c ,  d )  by model l i n e a r i z a t i o n .  The 
extended model i s  n o t  ' r i g h t ' ,  t h e  b a s i c  model i s  n o t  'wrong1-- 
f o r  i f  t h e  p o l i c y  maker w e r e  a b l e  t o  f i n d  t h e  s o c i a l l y  op t imal  
p o l i c y  w i t h  r ega rd  t o  t h e  ' r i g h t '  model, t h e r e  would be no rea-  
son f o r  him t o  use  t h e  'wrong' model i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l ace .  Thus, 
t h e  b a s i c  ( n o t  'wrong ' )  model i s  r e a l l y ,  f o r  a  g iven purpose,  
t h e  b e s t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  problem a t  hand, and t h e  extended 
( n o t  ' r i g h t ' )  model s i m u l a t e s  p o s s i b l e ,  n o t  a c t u a l  e r r o r s  i n  t h e  
b a s i c  model. Moreover, when apply ing  ou r  methodology, w e  do n o t  
have t o  s o l v e  t h e  more complicated extended model--neither t o  
op t imize  it e x a c t l y ,  nor  t o  determine e x a c t l y  t h e  impact of t h e  
basic-opt imal  ( n o t  'wrong ' )  p o l i c y  i n  t h i s  model. I n s t e a d  of 
t h i s ,  w e  apply l i n e a r  approximations t o  t h e  extended model so lu-  
t i o n s  i n  bo th  c a s e s ,  and approximate t h u s  t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
l o s s  a s  r e q u i r e d  i n  t h e  s t e p  ( d ) .  Our methodology pe rmi t s  t h u s  
t h e  p o l i c y  maker t o  choose a  r o b u s t  p o l i c y  ( v i z . ,  from a  given 
set of cand ida t e  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  one t h a t  makes t h e  s o c i a l  we l f a re  
l e a s t  s e n s i t i v e  t o  modeling e r r o r s )  wi thout  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e  
s o c i a l  we l f a re  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem be so lved  wi th  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  more complicated,  extended model. 
Our methodology a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  macroeconomic problems i n  
which p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t  s o c i a l  we l f a re  a t  p r e s e n t  and i n  t h e  f u t u r e  
and t h e r e  i s  a  t r a d e o f f  between t h e s e  we l f a re  e f f e c t s .  A s  noted 
i n  Sec t ion  1, a  l a r g e  number of  macro-economic problems s h a r e  
t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s .  The problem of i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment 
which w e  chose t o  ana lyse  performs simply an i l l u s t r a t i v e  pur- 
pose. I n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  i s  no reason why o u r  methodology should be 
a p p l i e d  s o l e l y  t o  macro problems. Microeconomic problems wi th  
t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  above--say, a  f i r m  maximizing t h e  d i scounted  
s t ream of i t s  p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  p r o f i t s  s u b j e c t  t o  u n c e r t a i n  
t echno log ica l  condi t ions- -a re  u s u a l l y  amenable. 
Yet,  w i t h i n  t h e  con f ines  of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  problem of  i n -  
f l a t i o n  and unemployment t r e a t e d  i n  t h i s  paper ,  we examined t h e  
m o n e t a r i s t  c a s e  f o r  c o n s t a n t  money growth r u l e s  and developed a  
r a t h e r  s c e p t i c a l  s t a n c e  i n  t h i s  r ega rd .  Fur thermore ,  w e  w e r e  
a b l e  t o  fo rmu la t e  a  r i g o r o u s  argument a g a i n s t  " impetuous" p o l i c y  
making ( i . e . ,  p o l i c i e s  which cause  t a r g e t  v a r i a b l e s  t o  approach 
t h e i r  long-run op t ima l  l e v e l s  r a p i d l y ) .  Such a  p o l i c y  s t r a t e g y  
may induce i n s t a b i l i t y ,  e i t h e r  through d e l a y  e f f e c t s ,  o r  by mak- 
i n g  t h e  nacroeconomic system very  s e n s i t i v e  t o  modeling e r r o r s .  
Although one cou ld  s u s p e c t  t h a t  such a  conc lu s ion  i s  valid--by 
comparing, s a y ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and unemployment 
p o l i c i e s  i n  c o u n t r i e s  such a s  A u s t r i a  and t h e  USA o r  Grea t  
B r i t a in - - a  r i g o r o u s  argument us ing  model u n c e r t a i n t y  and p o l i c y  
r o b u s t n e s s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  adds t o  a  f u r t h e r  unders tand ing  of  
t h i s  problem. 
APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS 
SoZutwn o f  the  Basic Mode2 
For the problem: 
1 2  2 
maximize W(x,u) = (1 - x (t) - 9 u  (t) ) dt 2 (All 
X I U  
subject to differential constraint--the state equation: 
we have the (current value) Hamiltonian function: 
and first-order optimality conditions 
together with the state equation (A2). We do not know yet 
whether a  s o l u t i o n  of  t h e  problem ( A l ) ,  ( A 2 )  e x i s t s .  However, 
i f  we s u b s t i t u t e  ( A 4 )  i n t o  ( A 2 )  and combine wi th  (A5) ,  we o b t a i n  
t h e  system of canon ica l  equa t ions :  
which can be so lved  by us ing  t h e  R i c c a t i  s u b s t i t u t i o n :  
where K ( t )  and M ( t )  a r e  supposed t o  be such t h a t  (A7) ho lds  i n -  
dependent ly  of xo. By s u b s t i t u t i n g  (A7) i n t o  t h e  second equa- 
t i o n  i n  (A6) whi le  t a k i n g  i n t o  account  t h e  f i r s t  one,  we o b t a i n  
o r ,  e q u i v a l e n t l y  
S ince  t h i s  equa t ion  should hold independent ly  of x o ,  t h u s ,  a l s o  
of x ( t ) ,  both  of i t s  s i d e s  must be zero.  I n  t h i s  way, w e  de r ived  
t h e  R i c c a t i  equa t ion :  
(t)  + r K ( t )  - 1 
and t h e  a u x i l i a r y  equa t ion  
These e q u a t i o n s  a r e  u s e f u l  f o r  many a s p e c t s  o f  a n a l y s i s  of  
o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  of  t h e  problem ( A l )  , (A2) : n o t  o n l y  t h e y  de- 
f i n e  c l o s e d - l o o p  c o n t r o l  laws and t h e  second-order  d e r i v a t i v e  
K ( t )  of  t h e  ( c u r r e n t  v a l u e )  Bellman o p t i m a l  v a l u e  f u n c t i o n ,  b u t  
a l s o  t h e y  can  be  used  t o  check s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  o p t i -  
m a l i t y .  One o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  forms o f  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  of  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  and o p t i m a l i t y  o f  s o l u t i o n s  t o  ( A l ) ,  (A2) i s  a s  
f o l l o w s  (see, f o r  example,  W i e r z b i c k i  1 9 7 7 ) :  
1) The s o l u t i o n s  s h o u l d  s a t i s f y  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  
(A41 (A51 (A21 - 
2) Tne second-order  d e r i v a t i v e  H o f  t h e  Hami l ton ian  
uu 
f u n c t i o n  (A3) s h o u l d  be s t r i c t l y  n e g a t i v e  f o r  a l l  t 
(which i s ,  i n d e e d ,  t h e  c a s e )  . 
3)  The R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n s  ( A l O ) ,  ( A l l )  s h o u l d  p o s s e s s  
bounded s o l u t i o n s  when s o l v e d  backward i n  time--which, 
i n  t h e  c a s e  of  c o n s t a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and a n  i n f i n i t e  
t i m e  i n t e r v a l ,  means t h a t  t h e y  s h o u l d  have a  s t a t i o n a r y  
s o l u t i o n  t h a t  i s  s t a b l e  backwards i n  t i m e .  
The l a s t  two c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  s t r i c t  n e g a t i v e  
d e f i n i t e n e s s  of  t h e  Hess ian  o p e r a t o r  of  t h e  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l  
r educed  t o  t h e  s p a c e  of  c o n t r o l  t r a j e c t o r i e s .  Now, t h e  s t a t i o n -  
a r y  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n  (A10) r e s u l t  from t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n  
and have t h e  form 
Of t h e s e  two s o l u t i o n s ,  o n l y  t h e  p o s i t i v e  one  i s  backward- 
s t a b l e .  W e  can check t h i s  by a p p l y i n g  t h e  f i r s t  Lapunov theo-  
r e m :  a  s o l u t i o n  o f  a  n o n l i n e a r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  i s  asymp- 
t o t i c a l l y  s t a b l e ,  i f  a  l i n e a r i z e d  e q u a t i o n  a t  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  i s  
a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  s t a b l e ,  and u n s t a b l e ,  i f  t h e  l i n e a r i z e d  e q u a t i o n  
is unstable. To check backward-stability, we change the sign of 
time, and linearize (A10) at K(t)=K to obtain 
where k(t) is a variation of K(t). This equation is asymptoti- 
2c2 
cally stable if - 2c2 K+r>O;but -K+ r=-+- 
q 9 
C2K from (A12) , 
K q  
hence we must have K>O. Hence, the backward stable stationary 
solution of (A10) is 
c2 (where we introduced a composite parameter v2 =- 2 , for reasons 
explained in the main text in the paper). The gqgation (All) 
has a stationary solution 
c2 1 
which is backward-stable if -K+ r=->O, hence if K>O. 
q K 
We can now substitute the values of K and M into (A7) , (A6) 
to obtain 
c2 2 Since Cu - -M=Cun(l-- K ) = rKCu the integration of (Al7) 
n q q n ' 
yields 
c2 rKCun rqun 
where u = - K; if we denote - - 
u C by f im,  then q 
By s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  i n t o  (A7) w e  o b t a i n  
rKqun 
where e , = ~ 8 ~ + ~ =  + C U , K ~  = T ( r K  q"n + - ) =- C ~ K ~  qun 
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By s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  i n t o  ( A 4 ) ,  w e  o b t a i n  
Now, t h e  s o l u t i o n s  (A19),  (A20) ,  (A21) a r e  indeed  t h e  so lu -  
t i o n s  of  t h e  problem ( A l )  , (A2) ,  s i n c e  t h e y  s a t i s f y  t h e  f i r s t -  
o r d e r  n e ce s sa r y  c o n d i t i o n s  and t hey  cor respond  t o  a  backward 
s t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n ,  wh i l e  t h e  second d e r i -  
v a t i v e  o f  t h e  Hamil tonian  f u n c t i o n  t h e r e  i s  s t r i c t l y  n e g a t i v e  
( t h u s ,  t h e  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l  W ,  t r e a t e d  a s  a  f u n c t i o n a l  o f  
c o n t r o l  t r a j e c t o r y  u  a l o n e ,  w h i l e  t h e  dependence on s t a t e  t r a -  
j e c t o r y  x  i s  reduced by s o l v i n g  t h e  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  (A2) and sub- 
s t i t u t i n g  i n t o  ( A l ) ,  h a s  i t s  second-order  d e r i v a t i v e - - t h e  
Hess ian  o p e r a t o r - - s t r i c t l y  n e g a t i v e  d e f i n i t e ;  t h i s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a  unique  maximum o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n a l .  
The c o n t r o l  t r a j e c t o r y  u  i s  h e r e  cons ide r ed  t o  be an  e lement  o f  
-rt 2  1 
a  H i l b e r t  space  w i t h  t h e  norm I 1 u  1 1 = ( Sme u  (t) d t )  1)) . 
0  
When a n a l y s i n g  t h e  o b t a i n e d  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n s ,  w e  obse rve  
t h a t  t n e y  depend a c t u a l l y  on t h r e e  pa ramete r s .  These pa r ame te r s  
a r e :  t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  r; t h e  n a t u r a l  unemployment r a t e  un; and 
c2 t h e  composi te  pa ramete r  v 2  = -2  t h a t ,  a t  g iven  r ,  cou ld  be t a k e n  
r q  
a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  t h e  we igh t ing  c o e f f i c i e n t  q  and 
t h e  squared  c o e f f i c i e n t  C L .  
Thus, t h e  R i c c a t i  c o e f f i c i e n t  K ,  d e f i n e d  by ( A 1 4 )  , depends 
2  
on r and v , w h i l e  r K  depends on v 2  a lone .  A t  a  g iven  v a l u e  o f  
r ,  K d e c r e a s e s  monoton ica l ly  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  v 2  from t h e  v a l u e  
1 
- a t  v+O ( s a y ,  q+m) t o  0  a s  v + m  ( s a y ,  q+O). On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  r 
a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  r ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  accoun t  t h e  dependence o f  v 2  
on r ( a t  g i v en  C,q)  K a l s o  d e c r e a s e s  monoton ica l ly  
from t h e  va lue  g a t  r-0 t o  0 a s  r-a (we could s e t  K = l / r  f o r  
L 2 2 l a r g e  enough r such t h a t  r > > 4 C / q ) .  The r e l a t i v e  speed co- 
e f f i c i e n t  u has t h e  form: 
Thus, i f  r i s  given ,  u i n c r e a s e s  monotonically a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  
v 2  from t h e  va lue  0 a t  v=O ( s ay ,  q-a) t o  a a s  v-a (q-0; we could 
set u w v  f o r  v > > 1 / 2 ) .  This  means t h a t  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  weight q  
t o  unemployment n e c e s s a r i l y  decreases  t h e  r e l a t i v e  speed of 
c o n t r o l .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a s  a  func t ion  of r a t  g iven C,q, 
t h e  speed c o e f f i c i e n t  u decreases  monotonical ly ,  from t h e  va lue  
c2 1 
a t  r = O ,  t o  t h e  va lue  0 a s  r- ( w e  could set  u-- f o r  r > > 2 ~ / q q )  . 
q r  
Thus, a  l a r g e r  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  a l s o  dec reases  t h e  r e l a t i v e  speed 
of c o n t r o l .  
However, i f  w e  assume t h a t  it i s  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b l e  t o  have 
t h e  r e l a t i v e  speed c o e f f i c i e n t  u a t  l e a s t  a s  l a r g e  a s  t h e  d i s -  
count  r a t e  r ,  u / r > l ,  - t hen  w e  e a s i l y  o b t a i n  from ( A 2 2 )  t h a t  t h i s  
2 
could happen on ly  i f  v - > 2  --and, from ( A 1 4 )  t h a t  t h i s  c o r r e s -  
ponds t o  KL . 2 For t h i s  range of v > 2  ( v > > 1 / 2 )  w e  can set 
- 
L 
' M V  = - = u 
1 max1 t h u s  u p r a c t i c a l l y  does n o t  depend on r and 
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changes only  wi th  C and q ,  dec reas ing  wi th  an inc reased  q .  
The op t imal  va lue  of t h e  s o c i a l  we l f a re  f u n c t i o n ,  a f t e r  
a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e g r a t i o n s  (omi t ted  he re )  has  t h e  form 
Observe t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  q u a d r a t i c  f u n c t i o n  of  x a ,  w i t h  
and 
Thus, t h e  c o s t a t e  v a r i a b l e  de te rmines  t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  
of t h e  o p t i m a l  v a l u e  f u n c t i o n ,  w h i l e  t h e  R i c c a t i  c o e f f i c i e n t - -  
i t s  second-order  d e r i v a t i v e .  These a r e  known p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h o s e  
v a r i a b l e s ,  and a r e  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  o n l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  check t h e  
c o r r e c t n e s s  of  a  r a t h e r  long  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  (A25).  The forms 
2.. AW and A W r e p r e s e n t  t h e  f i r s t  and second-order  p a r t s  o f  w e l f a r e  
l o s s e s  due t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  x0-9,. 
F i n a l l y ,  o b s e r v e  t h a t  w e  can r e p r e s e n t  t h e  op t im a l  c o n t r o l  
B ( t )  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  2 ( t )  and n o t  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  xo:  
which g i v e s  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  c losed- loop  op t im a l  c o n t r o l .  
CK U The feedback c o e f f i c i e n t  - = -  ha s  t h e  s a ne  p r o p e r t i e s  a s  t h e  r e l a -  
q c 
t i v e  speed c o e f f i c i e n t  u ,  s c a l e d  down by C.  Thus, f o r  u / r > l ,  - 
2  
v >2,  w e  have -=--- 
- 
CK - Thi s  ha s  an im por t a n t  i n t e r p r e t a -  
9 C 1' 
qT 
U t i o n :  s i n c e  G ( t ) - u  = - ( 2 ( t ) - f i m ) ,  hence a t  op t im a l  s o l u t i o n s ,  t h e  
n  0 
r a t i o  o f  t h e  (ou t -o f -equ i l ib r ium)  unemployment Ci( t)-u t o  t h e  
n  
(ou t -o f - eq u i l i b r i u m)  ex p ec t e d  i n f l a t i o n  B( t ) -P ,  approaches ,  b u t  
1 
never  exceeds ,  t h e  v a l u e  l/qT. 
Bounds on Parameter Chaxges 
In this theoretical exercise, bounds on parameter changes 
must be assumed heuristically, however, with some rational argu- 
ments. We observe that first 8_ = 7 un . If we are uncertain 
- 
about the actual natural rate of unemployment, un, the largest 
mistake we can reasonably postulate is related to the assumption 
that the current expected inflation x is equal to its long-term 
- C 0 
optimal value, x == G .., u =-  C B=u -u =-  0 C n' n rq X ~ '  X -u = n n r q O  n 
C 
rq(~O-2,) Such a mistake is not very probable: observing a 
real economic process, we can usually tell whether we are far or 
close to the long-term equilibrium. Thus, we assume that we can 
estimate at least half of the distance from the long-term equi- 
librium, whicn gives half as large bound on the uncertainty 
parameter B: 
To obtain a comparable bound on the parameter y, we assume 
that we observe correctly the variable 
x-xa - 
-- A = u-G - $(u-Gn) 2 
A n 
A-u+Gn 
which would give y=2 2 ' We are uncertain about both (u-an) 
L A-u+G and (u-Gn) . We can assume 1 A-u+G 1 < I  B I  
n n max since this 
uncertainty is related to the uncertainty in Gn. However, the 
larger is (u-G ) 2, the better conclusions we can obtain about 
n 
y; in a probabilistic estimation, this fact would correspond 
to the impact of the variance of the explaining variable. Thus, 
we must assume some minimal ' variance ' (u-Gn) ; if we take, 
2 2 arbitrarily, a rather small 'variance' (u-Bn) =4un, then we 
obtain the bound 
TO o b t a i n  a bound on t h e  maximal n e g l e c t e d  d e l a y  T~~~ w e  
n o t e  t n a t  i f  t h e - p o s t u l a t e d  op t ima l  change of  t h e  expec t ed  i n f l a -  
t i o n  h a s  t h e  form S ( t )  = (xo-kw) e - U t + ~ ,  and a r e a l  economic pro-  
c e s s  would e x h i b i t  a d e l a y  T i n  t h e  impact  o f  unemployment on i n -  
f l a t i o n ,  w e  would obse rve  a c t u a l  % ( t ) = x  f o r  t < ~ .  Thus, t h e  0 - 
observed d i f f e r e n c e  h a s  t h e  form: 
i ( t )  - 9 (t)  = (xo-ltw) (l-e-Ut) , (xo-9_) u t  , t < ~  - 
(A31) 
Now w e  assume a r b i t r a r i l y  t h a t  w e  might  over look  t h i s  d i f -  
f e r e n c e  u n t i l  i t s  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  becomes 2 5 % ,  t h a t  i s ,  u n t i l  
- - 
( )  - Thus, t h e  maximal de l ay  t h a t  we can  over look  i s  
X - 4 ' 
bouidea  by 
( h e r e  w e  assume t h a t  w e  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  range  o f  s o l u t i o n s  
2 
where u / r > l ,  - v - > 2, and u umax) . 
Sens i t iv i ty  t o  Errors i n  Estimating Natural Unemployment Rate 
I n  t n i s  c a s e ,  w e  assume t h a t  p o l i c i e s  d e r i v e d  from t h e  
~ a s i c  model w i t h  pa ramete r  u a r e  a p p l i e d  t o  an  ex tended  model, 
n 
which d i f f e r s  from t h e  b a s i c  one  on ly  by a changed paramete r  G n ,  
where ii -u =f3; t h e  pa ramete r  a= ( f3 ,0 ,0)  , t h e  pa ramete r  a= (0 , O  , 0 )  . 
n n - - 
Hence, i n  t h i s  s imp le  c a s e  w e  know t h e  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
extended model which w i l l  be deno ted  h e r e  by k ( t , a ) = x ( t , f 3 ) ,  
- 
Q (t ,g) =Q ( t ,  8 )  ; i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
I f  w e  s u b t r a c t  from t h e s e  s o l u t i o n s  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  (A18), ( A 2 1 )  
f o r  t h e  b a s i c  model--denoted h e r e  by 2 ( t , a )  - , Q(t  , a )  - --we o b t a i n  
A n 
- 
By t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of b a s i c  op t imal  v a r i a t i o n s  x ( t )  , u ( t )  -- 
see Equation (56)--we o b t a i n  i n  t h i s  ca se  
Now w e  cons ide r  t h e  family  of closed-loop c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s :  
and suppose such a  p o l i c y  i s  implemented t o  t h e  extended model 
wi th  finfun; w e  denote  t h e  s t a t e  and c o n t r o l  under such implemen- 
A A t a t i o n  by x  (t) , u  (t)  :
A CK A A (t) = - C ( Q ( t , a )  - -Gn+A (X t - t ; 
Now, l t ( t , a )  - s a t i s f i e s  l t ( t , a )  =-C ( G ( t , a )  - -un) ; by s u b t r a c t i n g  t h i s  
from both s i d e s  of Equation (A38), w e  o b t a i n  
A A A ( t)  - f t ( t , a )  - =-Au(x (t)  - 2 ( t , g ) )  +CP ; 
2 
where u= - and 8=Bn-un. The s o l u t i o n  of t h i s  equa t ion  i s  
q  
which, when set into (A37), yields 
Thus, the basic structural variations--see Equation (54)--we 
have the form 
and the extended structural variation--see Equation (55)--are 
A 1 2 (t) = %  (- (l-e-"Jt 
C ArK - (~-e-'~)) ; 
aA(t) = r ~ e  -ut-e-Aut 
To compute the second-order derivative gA of the welfare B  B  
losses--see Equation (53)--we have to integrate the expression 
which after rather long integrations and transformations (omitted 
here for brevity's sake; however, these transformations have been 
checked by assuming A=0,1, or and performing independent, 
simpler integrations and transformations) results in 
Now, the robustness coefficient &A = g A  / c% is easily B  B B  
determined 
aiiA 
The equation A= 0 is a quadratic equation in A (with the 
a h  
full form omitted for the sake of brevity); we choose by check- 
a2ffb 
iny the sign of - .A the root that indeed minimizes R 
ah2 B : 
While taking into account that rK = (1+4vL) - 1 is a mono- 
2v 2 2 tonically decreasing function of v2, with rK-1 as v -0, we can 
A 
show that X is a monotonically decreasing function of rK and B A 2 thus increasing function of v2, with X -1.5 as v -0. The graphs B 
of 1 and 6' are given in Figures 3, 5 in the main text. B B 
The open and the closed-loop Hamiltonian maximizing policies 
as well as the open and closed-loop benefit-to-cost maximizing 
policies are considered in the main text. 
Here we show only that the welfare losses under the open- 
loop benefit-to-cost maximizing policy are larger than the cor- 
responding welfare losses under the open-loop policy. With this 
aim, we recall Equation (78) for the extended structural varia- 
tions : 
where 
Since  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  under t h e  open-loop p o l i c y  
have t h e  form ( s e e  Equation (A43), where we should s e t  X = O )  : 
- u t  g O ( t )  = C t  - F ( l - e  ) > 0 ; Go ( t)  = rKe - u t  - 1 < 0 
- f o  - f o  
and do n o t  depend on xo , when computing x  ( t)  , u ( t)  we can 
assume any reasonable  xo t h a t  does no t  i n c r e a s e  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  
unneces sa r i l y .  The most reasonable  assumption i s  x,=8-, which 
V - 
means t h a t  we w i l l  compute k f O ( t )  , c f 0 ( t )  along t h e  long-term 
equ i l i b r ium f o r  t h e  b a s i c  model. I n  such a  c a s e ,  we o b t a i n  
q f o  = 1 - rite - u t  f o  c - u t  + K (F + rqC(1-e ) ) 
Observe t h a t  f o r  reasonable  va lues  of q ,  u  v 2  we have 
-0 n '  
~ ( 8 , G , a ) = l a n d  - rfo << r / C ,  qfo=-u ( t ) + ~ ~ ( t ) ,  where ~ ~ ( t )  i s  a  
smal l  p o s i t i v e  func t ion .  Thus, a l s o  Gfo ( t)  =GO ( t )  - E ~  ( t )  , where 
0 
E ( t )  i s  a  smal l  p o s i t i v e  f u n c t i o n ;  b u t  ii (t)  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  hence 
Z f O  ( t)  ) > (go ( t)  ) 2 .  The Equation (A47 ) can be r e w r i t t e n  a s  (u  
Zfo - f o  - f o  
x ( t)  =-Cu ( t)  ; x ( 0 )  = 0 (A52) 
whi le  go (t)  = -CGO ( t)  , k0 ( 0 )  = 0 .  Thus, t h e  s o l u t i o n  of  (A52 ) has  
£0 
a l s o  t h e  form (t) =a0 ( t )  +c3 (t) , where E (t)  i s  a  smal l  p o s i t i v e  
£0 3  f u n c t i o n ,  and (k  t ) > ( ( t  ) . Therefore ,  we o b t a i n  t h e  i n -  
e q u a l i t y  
which means that the welfare loss with the open-loop benefit-to- 
cost maximizing policy is larger than the loss with the open- 
loop policy. In an analogous way, the same result can be estab- 
lished for the closed-loqp benefit-to-cost maximizing policy 
versus the closed-loop policy. 
Sensitivity to Mistaken Fmctional Specification 
We assume here f3=0, yfO, T=O. Thus, the extended model has 
the form 
2(t) = -C (u (t) 2 - u  U t  u 1 ; x(0) = x  
n 2 0 (A541 
First we must derive the basic optimal variations. The Hamilton- 
nian function for the optimization problem related to the ex- 
tended model has the form 
and yields the necessary conditions of optimality 
H = 0  ' qu(t) +yCg(t) (~(t) -un) -Ci(t) = O  
u 
W e  d e n o t e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  ex tended  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem 
A A .. . . 
by f i ( t , y )  = Q(t,a): y;(t)  + o ( y )  , B ( t , y )  = f ( t . ~ )  + y x ( t )  + o  ( y )  , 
A A 
5 ( t , y )  = T ( t , a )  - + y g ( t )  + o ( y ) .  W e  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  i n t o  
n 
(A56G58) , s u b t r a c t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  f o r  Q ( t , a )  - , B ( t , a )  - , T ( t , ~ )  a s  
d e f i n e d  by t h e  b a s i c  model ( A 4 )  , (A5) , (A2) and o b t a i n  a s  ex- 
p l a i n e d  i n  t h e  main t e x t ,  t h e  se t  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  f o r  
b a s i c  o p t i m a l  v a r i a t i o n s :  
where 




e q u a t i o n s  (A59e61) h a s  t r i v i a l  s o l u t i o n s  u ( t )  = o ,  T (t) =0,  x ( t )  = o .  
CK I f  Q ( t , a ) - ~ ~ = - ( x ~ - % ~ ) e  - -" i s  p o s i t i v e  and i n c r e a s e s - - s a y ,  i f  
q  
xO i n c r e a s e s  above fw-- then Y and $ i n c r e a s e  w i t h  it monotoni- 
c a l l y .  The s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  l i n e a r  set  o f  e q u a t i o n s  (A60) ;  (A61) 
w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  $+Y (more p r e c i s e l y ,  a  norm o f  
t h e  s o l u t i o n s  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  t h e  norm o f  $+Y, where w e  c o u l d  
w -r t  k 
t a k e  a s  a  norm 1 1 $+Y 1 1 = ( f e ( 3  ( t )  +Y (t) ) ' d t )  2 .  A g e n e r a l  
0 
way o f  s o l v i n g  E q u a t i o n s  (A59GA61) c o n s i s t s  o f  a  R i c c a t i  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  
where K ( t )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  R i c c a t i  e q u a t i o n  ( A l O ) ,  s i n c e  t h e  homo- 
geneous p a r t s  o f  E q u a t i o n s  (A63) ,  (A61) and t h a t  o f  Equa t ion  
(A61 a r e  i d e n t i c a l ;  t h u s ,  w e  t a k e  t h e  backward s t a b l e  s t a t i o n a r y  
s o l u t i o n  of ( A l O ) ,  K ( t ) = K  a s  d e f i n e d  by Equa t ion  ( 1 5 ) .  The 
a u x i l i a r y  e q u a t i o n  f o r  ( t )  i s  d i f f e r e n t ;  however, s i n c e  Equa- 
t i o n s  ( A 6 0 )  , ( A 6 1 )  have t h e  same form a s  Equa t ion  ( A 6 )  excep t  
f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  @ + Y  s u b s t i t u t e s  un, we o b t a i n  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
s i m i l a r  t o  ( A l l )  : 
where K + r = 1 / K  from ( A 1 2 )  . The g e n e r a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
q  
( A l l )  and ( A 6 4 )  i s  t h a t  $+Y i s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  t i m e ,  whi l e  u  i s  
n  
a  c o n s t a n t .  Thus, t o  o b t a i n  a  g e n e r a l  backward s t a b l e ,  bounded 
s o l u t i o n  t o  (A64) w e  have t o  c o n s i d e r  i t s  g e n e r a l  s o l u t i o n :  
and, a f t e r  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  we choose M ( 0 )  i n  such a  way t h a t  
t h e  unbounded t e r m s  w i t h  e  t / K  van i sh  from t h e  s o l u t i o n .  While 
a l l  t h i s  can be done, t h e  s o l u t i o n s  have r a t h e r  compl ica ted  
forms and r e s u l t  i n  ve ry  t e d i o u s  i n t e g r a t i o n s  when f u r t h e r  com- 
p u t i n g  t h e  second-order d e r i v a t i v e  of w e l f a r e  l o s s e s  S h  . Thus, 
Y Y  
w e  a r e  going t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  computat ions  by a c c e p t i n g  approxi-  
mate e x p r e s s i o n s  f o r  a l l  v a r i a t i o n s .  The s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i s  
based on t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  a l l  v a r i a t i o n s  depend monotoni- 
CK - u t  
c a l l y  on t h e  norm o f  G ( t , a ) - u n = - ( x o - x m ) e  - ; i f  we s u b s t i t u t e  
=I 
t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  by a  c o n s t a n t  f u n c t i o n  of t i m e ,  s a y ,  by . a ( t , a )  - 
n 17 
- 
L A  
u  =-(xO-xm),  we would on ly  e s t i m a t e  a l l  v a r i a t i o n s  and t h e i r  
n  q  A I 
impact  on s A  from above. However, when e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  bound on 
Y Y  2 2 
max 
we assumed a  ' v a r i a n c e '  (u-un) by 4un. Correspondingly ,  
we should  assume some v a l u e  o f  x  i f  we t a k e  xo such t h a t  0 ; 
fi ( t ,  - a )  -un * u  on ave rage ,  t h e  ' v a r i a n c e '  (u-un) might  be con- 
n  
s i d e r e d  t o  be c l o s e  t o  4u: because of t h e  a c t u a l  t ime-dependence 
of f i ( t , a ) .  - C l e a r l y ,  t h e  cho i ce  of t h e  ' v a r i a n c e '  and t h e  bound 
Ymax o r  t h e  cor responding  ' ave rage '  Q ( t , a ) - u n * u n  - a r e  a r b i t r a r y  
and a f f e c t  t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  of t h e  f i n a l l y  d e r i v e d  r o b u s t n e s s  
A h  
c o e f f i c i e n t  R . For a  more p r e c i s e  e s t i m a t i o n  of r o b u s t n e s s  
Y 
c o e f f i c i e n t ,  w e  would have t o  e s t i m a t e  econome t r i ca l l y  y  
max 
and 
x O ,  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p r e c i s e  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  Y and @ ,  and i n t e g r a t e  
a l l  v a r i a t i o n a l  e q u a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  p r e c i s e  form, u s i n g  numer- 
i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  i f  n e c e s s a r y .  Here, i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a n  example, w e  per fo rm o n l y  approximate  c a l c u l a t i o n s  under  a  
r e a s o n a b l e  se t  of  a s sumpt ions .  
Under t h e  approximate  assumpt ion  ii (t  , - a )  -un " un,  t h e  f  unc- 
t i o n s  Y and 4 t a k e  t h e  form: 
and t h e  e q u a t i o n  (A64) h a s  a  s t a t i o n a r y ,  backward s t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  
Now, w e  s u b s t i t u t e  (A63) i n t o  ( ~ 6 1 )  t o  o b t a i n  
2 2 2 C - S i n c e  1 --- - r K  and t h u s  C ( @ + Y )  - -  M = r K C  l u 2  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
9 9 2 n '  
of  (A6.8) i s  
2 
w i t n  u =- K .  Correspond ing ly ,  w e  u s e  (A63 ) t o  o b t a i n  
9 
and (A5Q) y i e l d s  
We now t u r n  t o  t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  corresponding 
t o  t h e  family  of  c losed- loop p o l i c i e s  (A37). By s u b s t i t u t i n g  (A37) 
i n t o  (A53), we o b t a i n  
X 1 (t)  = - C ( Q ( t , a )  - - u  n  + (t)  - P ( t , a )  - y (G(t,a) 
X W e  assume t h e  s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  form x  (t)  = ~ t ( t , ~ )  cyxX (t) + 0 ( y )  , 
X 
u  ( t)  = ~ ( t , a )  - + y ~ \ t )  + o ( ~ )  , s u b s t i t u t e  them i n t o  (A72) and s u b t r a c t  
t h e  equa t ion  of t h e  b a s i c  model, subdiv ide  by y and l e t  y+O. 
A l l  t h i s  y i e l d s  t h e  equa t ion  f o r  t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s :  
-A 2 KC -X -A 
x  (t)  = X -x ( t)  + C +  ; x  (0)  = 0  9  
Again, w e  would have t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h i s  equa t ion  f o r  a  p r e c i s e  
form of t h e  func t ion  $I; however, assuming t h e  approximate form 
( A 6 6 )  we o b t a i n  
-A 
x  (t) =l u2 3- (1-e - X u t  2 n  XKC 1 
CK -A From (A37) , w e  have uX (t) = A  - x  ( t)  ; t h e r e f o r e  
q  
-X 1 2  
u  ( t)  = -  - X U ~  un (1-e ) 
The extended s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  ob ta ined  a s  
A 
- A  -A - 1 2 3  1 - 
x  ( t)  = x  ( t )  - x ( t )  = - u  (- (1-e - u t  2 n  C X r K  " t ) - 5 ( l - e  ) )  
Even under  t h e  s i m p l i f y i n g  assumpt ions  of  c o n s t a n t  4 and Y ,  
t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  second-order  d e r i v a t i v e  6' o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  
YY 
l o s s e s  i s  r a t h e r  long :  
(Again,  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  h a s  been checked by independen t  i n t e g r a -  
t i o n s  f o r  s e p a r a t e  X = O ,  l, o r  w ) .  Now, it i s  e a s y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
the r o b u s t n e s s  c o e f f i c i e n t  
a 2 
The e q u a t i o n  *= 0  i s a g a i n  a  q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t i o n  i n  A ;  
however, i t s  r o o t  t h a t  i n d e e d  minimizes kh might  become n e g a t i v e ,  
Y 
and w e  have t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  X > O  - imposed by s t a b i l i t y  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  c l o s e d - l o o p  p o l i c y  (A37).  Thus,  w e  o b t a i n  
which y i e l d s  s m a l l e r  v a l u e s  o f  i (see F i g u r e  5a i n  t h e  main 
h Y 
t e x t )  t h a n  X de te rmined  by (A47).  However, a  much more s i m p l e  B 
e x p r e s s i o n :  
A A h  
yields values such that h  < h < h  (see Figure 5a; this inequality 
Y B 
can be also proven analytically, but we omit these details). 
A 
The compromise on robustness coefficients ih and ih at h=h is 6 Y 
quite satisfactory (see Figure 5b). 
Sensitivity to Delays 
We assume here tha,t @=Of y=O and ~$0. Thus, the extended 
model equation is 
~ ( 0 )  =xO ; u(t) given for t~[-T;O) (A8 1 
When maximizing the welfare functional (Al) under the difference- 
differential constraint (A81), we use the modified Hamiltonian 
function 
H C =1-$x2 (t) - y u  2 (t) + <(t) C (u(t-T) -un) 
However, this function is used for maximization with res- 
pect to u (t) alone (not to u(t+~) nor u(t-T) ) . Thus, it is suff i- 
cient to consider only a part of this function: 
- 2 
~ = l - l x ~  (t) - 5 u  (t) +<(t+r) -c(u(~) -un) 2 (A831 
Denote the solutions to the optimization problem of the 
extended model by Q(~,T), S(~,T), t(t,~). The necessary condi- 
tion of optimality is that the function Hz--or equivalently, 
the function c--has a maximum in u(t) at the optimal solution. 
Thus: 
The c o s t a t e  equa t ion  f o r  t h i s  problem r e t a i n s  i t s  b a s i c  form, 
s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  no d e l a y s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  i n  t h i s  problem: 
and t h e  s t a t e  equa t ion ,  a f t e r  s u b s t i t u t i n g  (A84), t a k e s  t h e  form 
8 ( t , ~ )  given by (A79) f o r  t€[O;TI (A86) 
Now, t h e  system of canonica l  equa t ions  (A85),  (A86) does 
n o t  c o n t a i n  delayed terms and i s ,  fo rma l ly ,  i d e n t i c a l  w i th  (A6).  
h 
Thus, we could t r y  t o  use  t h e  known s o l u t i o n s  k ( t , a )  - , c, ( t , ~ )  of  
(A6) t o  o b t a i n  t n e  s o l u t i o n s  of (A85) , (A86) . This  would, how- 
e v e r ,  be i n c o r r e c t  s i n c e  t h e  s t a t e  t r a j e c t o r y  8 ( t , ~ )  f o r  t€[O;T] 
i s  predetermined by t h e  given u ( t )  f o r  t ~ [ - T ; O ] ;  t h u s ,  a  c o r r e c t  
way i s  t o  a c c e p t  t h i s  i n i t i a l  p a r t  of  t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  and s t a r t  
t o  op t imize  t h e  s t a t e  t r a j e c t o r y  a t  t = ~ ,  wi th  a  new i n i t i a l  s t a t e  
x ( , )  Proceeding t h i s  way, we can w r i t e  t h e  op t imal  s o l u t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  op t imiza t ion  problem of  t h e  extended model: 
E c ( t , ~ )  = ( ~ ( T , T )  - f t w ) e  -u ( t - T )  +Eta, , f o r  t > - r  - (A87) 
h - u ( t - T )  A 
c , ( t ,~ )  = I < ( ~ ( T , T )  - S w ) e  + <a , f o r  t > T (A88) 
- 




wnere ?( - r , - r )  must be ob ta ined  by so lv ing  t h e  equa t ion  (A811 f o r  
~ E [ O ; T ]  and kw, S W , u  a r e  t h e  same a s  i n  t h e  b a s i c  op t imal  
s o l u t i o n s .  
However, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w e  can a c t u a l l y  o p t i m i z e  e x p l i c i t l y  
t h e  ex tended  model w i t h  d e l a y s  i s  due t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  
t h i s  model ( w e  nave o n l y  one  de layed  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  s t a t e  equa- 
t i o n ;  w e  c o u l d  n o t  g e t  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h i s  model a s  e a s i l y  i f ,  
f o r  example, t h e  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  would c o n t a i n  b o t h  d e l a y e d  and 
undelayed c o n t r o l ) .  Thus, w e  s h a l l  p roceed  f u r t h e r  a s  i f  t h e  
e x p l i c i t  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  (A87i89) f o r  t h e  ex tended  model were 
n o t  known. 
A A 




+ o ( T )  , 5 ( t , ~ ) = <  ( ~ , & ) + T ~ ( ~ ) + o ( T ) ,  and u s e  (A34) t o  o b t a i n :  
1 A Observe t h a t  l i m  - (5  ( t + ~ , . r ) - ;  ( t , ~ ) ) = t  ( t , 0 ) = ;  ( t , a )  . Hence, when 
T - T+O 
s u b d i v i d i n g  b o t h  s i d e s  of (A89) by T and l e t t i n g  T + O ,  w e  o b t a i n  
t h e  e q u a t i o n  f o r  t h e  b a s i c  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  v a r i a t i o n :  
S i m i l a r l y ,  by s u b t r a c t i n g  from b o t h  s i d e s  o f  (A81) t h e  c o r r e s -  
ponding s i d e s  of  (A2) , w e  have 
1 Since  l i m  -(Q(t-T,T) - C i ( t , ~ )  ) = - Q ( t , 0 )  = - G ( t , a )  ( t h e  c o n t r o l  i n  T - 
T+O 
t h e  b a s i c  model i s  a  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n  of t i m e ) ,  we o b t a i n  
The equa t ion  f o r  c o s t a t e  v a r i a t i o n  i s  e a s i l y  der ived :  
fiowever, s i n c e  (t,a) = a ( t .  a )  , t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of (A91) i n t o  q  (A93) y i e l d s  
Now, t h e  system of canon ica l  equa t ions  ( ~ 9 4 ) ~  (A95) i s  
A A 






w e  o b t a i n  M ( t )  GO. Since ,  however, x  (0 )  = O r  s (t)  = ~ % ( t )  y i e l d s  
A A 
- 
n e c e s s a r i l y  x ( t )  E O ,  5 ( t ) = O .  Thus, we have t h e  b a s i c  op t imal  
v a r i a t i o n s  
A 
- 
5 ( t )  G O  
I f  we apply t n e  fami ly  (A37) of c losed- loop p o l i c i e s  t o  
t n e  extended model (A81) , we o b t a i n  
X 
x  (t) given by (A81) f o r  t€[O; T I  
We assume t h a t  (A96) has  s t a b l e  s o l u t i o n s  ( i n  f u r t h e r  t e x t ,  we 
w i l l  ana lyse  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  cond i t i ons  f o r  (A96) ) .  Therefore ,  
X 
we can approximate x (t)=8(tfa)+~xh(t)+o(r). - By subtracting (A2) 
from both sides of (A96), we have 
t - a - a  - - CK A 
= -T C e (  + h -(% (t-T) + 7 o(T))) 
T GI 
which yields, if .T+O 
Thus, basic structural variations are determined by integrating 
(A9 9 
CK -A and by substituting 5' (t) =A - x (t) 
GI 
-A u (t) = _  x u--(xo-j2,) CK (e -hut - e-ut) 
X l  GI 
It now remains to determine the extended structural variations. 
A 
-A - U 
x ( t )  = x (t)  - x ( t )  =-(x -ftm) ( e  - A u t  - u t )  A - 1  0 - e  
and t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  second-order d e r i v a t i v e  of t h e  we l f a re  l o s s :  
Now, t h e  robus tnes s  c o e f f i c i e n t  G: has  t h e  form 
and i s  a  monotonical ly  dec reas ing  f u n c t i o n  of  A .  I t  would be 
wrong, however, t o  assume t h a t  we should choose very l a r g e  A i n  
o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  smal l  v a l u e s  of 6::  very l a r g e  A might r e s u l t  
i n  i n s t a b i l i t y  of (A96) and, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  a p e r i o d i c  approxima- 
t i o n  xA ( t)  de f ined  by (A99) does n o t  hold any longer  f o r  l a r g e  A .  
Since  t h e  equa t ion  (A96) i s  l i n e a r ,  i t s  s t a b i l i t y  i s  d e t e r -  
mined by i t s  homogeneous p a r t :  
k ( t )  =-Aux( t - r )  ; x ( t )  = O  f o r  t < O ,  x ( 0 )  = x o  
To ana lyse  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of t h i s  equa t ion ,  we f i r s t  apply Laplace 
t r ans fo rma t ion  t o  bo th  s i d e s  of it: 
and r e p r e s e n t  t h e  r e s u l t  a s  a  feedback sys tem,  w i t h  t h e  feedback 
e r r o r  X (s)  and t h e  o u t p u t  v a r i a b l e  Y (s)  =K (s) X (s) , determined by 
X U  - T S .  t h e  open-loop t r a n s f e r  f u n c t i o n  K ( s ) = - e  . 
S 
Now, w e  can u se  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  Nyquis t  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  of feedback sys tems .  W e  a n a l y s e  t h e  argument and t h e  
Xu . - jw~  
module o f  t h e  complex v a r i a b l e  K ( j w ) = -  , where j  i s  t h e  jw 
imaginary u n i t .  W e  have 
The Nyquis t  c r i t e r i o n  s t a t e s  ( i n  t h i s  s imp le  c a s e )  t h a t  t h e  feed-  
back sys tem i s  s t a b l e  i f  ( ~ ( j w  ) <1 f o r  w o  such  t h a t  argK(jwo)  
=-IT 71 . Thus , w e  have w = - 0  2T O" 2 X u i  < 1 g u a r a n t e e i n g  s t a b i l i t y ,  and - = -wo 71 which can be r e w r i t t e n  a s :  
However, i n  c l a s s i c a l  feedback sys tems t h e o r y  it i s  a l s o  
known t h a t  i f  t h e  Nyquis t  c r i t e r i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  50% margin 
( l ~ ( j w ~ )  / < 0 . 5 )  
t h e n  t h e  dynamic s o l u t i o n s  i n  t h e  feedback sys tem might  be 
r e a s o n a b l y  approximated by a p e r i o d i c  s o l u t i o n s  ( t h e  sys tem i s  
f a r  enough from i t s  s t a b i l i t y  boundary, hence ,  t h e  c losed- loop  
s o l u t i o n  might  be approximated by a p e r i o d i c  f unc t i ons - - i f  t h e  
open-loop i t s e l f  i s  a p e r i o d i c ) .  
The r e f o r e ,  w e  conclude t h a t  t h e  approximat ion (A99) of  t h e  
s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  ex tended  model under c losed- loop  p o l i c i e s  might 
be r ea son ab ly  a p p l i e d  o n l y  i f  ( A l l l )  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  I f  w e  assume 
1 
t h e n  w e  t r a n s f o r m  c o n d i t i o n  (A110) t o  t h e  form 
o r ,  w i t h  50% margin 
L 
which, g iv en  a n  e s t i m a t e d  T and r ,  l i m i t s  t h e  maximal v and,  
1 
I 
t h u s ,  t h e  maximal r e l a t i v e  speed o f  c o n t r o l ,  2 = ( 1 + 4 v ~ ) ~  - 1
r 2 
2 c2 t h a t  can be assumed ( s a y ,  by choosing q i n  v when apply-  
* r q 
i n g  a c losed- loop  p o l i c y  w i t h  X = X .  
FOOTNOTES 
1. The m o n e t a r i s t s  have a l s o  j u s t i f i e d  t h e i r  c o n s t a n t  monetary 
growth r u l e  by a r g u i n g  t h a t  p o l i c y  makers t end  t o  misspec i -  
f y  t h e i r  monetary r u l e s  by a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s t a b i l i z e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  growth r a t e s  of  t h e  money supp ly .  The 
r e l e v a n c e  of  t h i s  argument h a s  become muted i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
a s  a  number o f  governments-- including t h e  American and t h e  
Br i t i sh - -have  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  on monetary s t o c k s  
and less on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e i r  f o rmu la t i on  o f  monetary 
p o l i c i e s .  
2 .  I t  i s  f e a s i b l e  t o  r e l a x  t h i s  assumpt ion i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
o u r  a n a l y s i s .  
3 .  However, Snower (1981) h a s  shown t h a t  s y s t e m a t i c  monetary 
p o l i c y  may remain e f f e c t i v e  i f  t h e  macro-economic model i s  
n o n l i n e a r .  Y e t  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  op t ima l  p o l i c y  r u l e s  under 
r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  l i e s  beyond t h e  scope o f  t h i s  pape r .  
4 .  The extended model s e r v e s  a s  a  gu inea  p i g ,  an expe r imen t a l  
l a b o r a t o r y  f i e l d  f o r  checking conc lu s ions  d e r i v e d  from t h e  
b a s i c  model. The need f o r  such models i n  economic a n a l y s i s  
is  paramount and t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  a t t e m p t s  a t  u s ing  such 
models i n  p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d  a n a l y s i s .  I n  t h i s  paper ,  a  much 
more t h e o r e t i c a l l y  o r g a n i s e d  way o f  u s ing  such models i s  
proposed.  
Inaccuracies (a) and (b) might be formally equivalent. For 
example, the functional form of the Phillips curve in the 
extended model may be expanded by Taylor series. The co- 
efficients of the higher-order terms may be set to zero in 
the basic model. Then the mistaken parameter estimates of 
the basic model are responsible for its "simplistic" func- 
tional specification. Nevertheless, it is heuristically 
useful to distinguish between (a) and (b) . Thus, we denote 
the discrepancy above as a case of (b) rather than (a). 
We make a distinction between delays and lags. A dynamic 
delay is the time after which the first effect of an exog- 
enous impulse are observed. An econometric lag is the time 
after which the statistically most significant effects are 
observed. Thus, delays are usually smaller than lags. 
This combination falls in the tradition of Vanderkamp 
(1975) , Uornbusch and Fischer (1978) , and others. 
For the discussion of other possible formulations of the 
decision-maker's objective function see Wierzbicki 
(1980a, b). 
Except, possibly, at the initial time t=O, if the initial 
values x(O)=x and u(0)=uo do not coincide with an optimal 
path. In suca a case, a sharp change of m might be re- 
quired to bring them on an optimal path. 
The case in which m lags T units of time behind u is ana- 
lytically uninteresting. The optimal trajectory of m(t) 
implied by the basic model becomes identical, in this case, 
with the optimal trajectory of m(t-r) of the extended model. 
Here, by dual control problem we understand (following 
Feldbaum 1962) a problem of joint estimation of model 
parameters and optimization of control. Only very simple 
classes of dual control problems possess known solutions. 
This is because the state equation, at a=a, is linear in 
- - 
x(t) and u(t). If it were not, the integrand in (53) 
should be based on the second derivatives of the Hamilton- 
ian function. 
Strictly speaking, pi (t) and iii (t) are extended structural 
sensitivity operators, not variations; by variations we should 
rather understand i1 (t) (a-a) and iii (t) (a-a) . However, 
- - 
we shall use hifurther text the colloquial name variations 
for k1 (t) and u (t) . 
Clearly, ~i 
'a a is semi-positive definite, as a generalized 
- - 
positive combination of semi-positive definite matrices 
x i  (t) xi ( t  and uiT (t) ui (t) . 
15. I t  shou ld  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  methodology p r e s e n t e d  i n  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  n o t  new: it h a s  been developed by 
Wierzb ick i  (1969) and g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  f o r  models 
d e s c r i b e d  by Banach space  e q u a t i o n s  by Wierzb ick i  and 
Dontchev ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  a  f u l l  d e s c r i p t i o n  can a l s o  be found i n  
Wierzb ick i  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  However, t h i s  methodology h a s  n o t ,  a s  
y e t ,  been a p p l i e d  t o  economic problems.  I t  goes  w i t h o u t  
s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  ex tend  f a r  beyond t h e  
t h e  t o p i c  o f  t h i s  paper .  
1 6 .  The e x p r e s s i o n  (75)  i s  one o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o f  a  q u a d r a t i c  
e q u a t i o n ;  t h e  o t h e r  s o l u t i o n  ( w i t h  t h e  s i g n  b e f o r e  t h e  
s q u a r e  r o o t  i n  (75)  changed t o  p l u s )  i s  e l i m i n a t e d  because  
£0 
o n l y  (75)  s a t i s f i e s  u fO (t) = i i ( t , a )  - a t  B=0, x  ( t)  =8(t ,g) .  
17.  W e  per form t h i s  l i n e a r i z a t i o n  by s u b t r a c t i n g  h ( t ,  a )  = 
- C ( i i ( t , a ) - u n  - from b o t h  s i d e s  o f  ( 7 6 ) ,  subdividing- the  re- 
s u l t s  by B and l e t t i n g  8+0. E q u i v a l e n t l y ,  w e  can employ 
t h e  theorem on t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  dependence o f  t h e  so lu -  
t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  on pa ramete r s .  
18.  T h i s  f o l l o w s  from t h e  second Lapunov theorem on t h e  s t a b i l -  
i t y  o f  n o n l i n e a r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  when a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  
f  0 
e q u a t i o n  (76)  . Observe t h a t  even i f  8=0, b u t  x  ( 0 )  #xo 
( f o r  example, due  t o  an  e r r o r  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  i n i t i a l  i n f l a -  
t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s )  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  u n s t a b l e  v a r i a t i o n a l  
'fo Q ( t , a ) 9 ( t 1 a )  - - 
e q u a t i o n  x  (t)  =C zfo (t)  f o r  t h e  p ropaga t i on  o f  
v ( k , Q , a )  
- f o  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  x  ( 0 )  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e .  
19.  T h i s  does  n o t  mean t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t - t o - c o s t  maximizing 
p o l i c i e s  miqht  n o t  be d e s i r a b l e  i n  o t h e r  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  when e t ( t , a )  i s  n e g l i g i b l e .  See Wierzb ick i  
(1977) f o r  examples OF such a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  non-economic 
c o n t e x t .  
20. Such a  d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  has  been proved by Dontchev (1980) 
f o r  a  b r o ad e r  c l a s s  o f  problems,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  problem 
c o n s i d e r ed  h e r e .  
21. See f o o t n o t e  6 ;  an e s t i m a t e  of  an  economet r i c  l a g  i n  u  would 
have t o  b e ,  most p robab ly ,  a  h i g h e r  number. 
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